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The  Unstable  EMS 
FROM  THE  STANDPOINT  OF  EUROPEAN  MONETARY  AFFAIRS,  1992 
opened with a bang and closed with a whimper.  In January,  the Euro- 
pean  monetary  system (EMS)  celebrated  five years  of exchange  rate sta- 
bility: sixty full months without a realignment.  The month before, the 
representatives  of European  Community  (EC) member-states  initialed 
the Treaty  on Economic and Monetary  Union concluded  at Maastricht 
in the Netherlands.  The transition  to European  monetary  union (EMU) 
appeared  to be fully underway. 
By the end  of the year, the European  monetary  system  had  endured- 
indeed,  was continuing  to experience-the  most severe crisis in its four- 
teen-year  history. Two of ten currencies,  the Italian  lira  and the British 
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pound, had been driven  from the system. (Of the twelve EC countries, 
Greece is not a member  of the exchange  rate mechanism  (ERM), while 
Luxembourg's franc is set at par to Belgium's franc.) Other currenCies.. 
including  the Spanish  peseta and the Portuguese  escudo, had been de- 
valued  involuntarily.  ' Some of the affected  countries  reimposed  capital 
controls. British  Prime  Minister  John Major  and others complained  of 
"fault  lines"  running  through  the European  monetary  system.2  The EC's 
monetary  committee, the body responsible  for coordinating  the opera- 
tion of the system, held three meetings  in the final  months  of the year in 
a fruitless effort to identify and repair  the system's flaws. Clearly, the 
process that  was supposed  to culminate  in monetary  union  had suffered 
a serious setback. 
As we explain  in this paper,  until  the summer  of 1992,  anticipations  of 
a smooth transition  to monetary  union had stabilized  expectations and 
hence the operation  of the EMS. At that  point, the protracted  process of 
negotiation  and  ratification  allowed  doubts  to surface  about  whether  the 
treaty would ever come into effect. This altered  the costs and benefits 
of the policies of austerity  required  of countries seeking to qualify  for 
European  monetary  union, leading  the markets  to anticipate  that those 
policies would ultimately  be abandoned. 
Certain  perverse  incentives  built  into the treaty  complicated  the situ- 
ation  further.  One of the four convergence  criteria  required  of countries 
qualifying  for European  monetary  union  is that  they maintain  exchange 
rate stability:  they must  keep their  currencies  within  their  EMS fluctua- 
tion bands "without  severe tensions"  for at least two years before inau- 
gurating  monetary  union.  A speculative  attack  forcing  a devaluation  that 
prevents a country from satisfying this requirement  might, by elimi- 
nating  the lure  of membership  in the monetary  union, induce  its govern- 
ment to abandon  its current  policy regime. Because the country, once 
driven  out of the EMS, might  no longer  qualify  for EMU membership,  it 
would have no incentive to continue pursuing  the policies of austerity 
necessary to gain entry. Thus a speculative  attack  could prove self-ful- 
filling. 
We develop this hypothesis  by contrasting  two models  of balance-of- 
payments crises. The first, following Paul Krugman3  and Robert P. 
1. The Irish  punt  joined the list in early 1993. 
2. Ivo Dawnay  and  Robert  Graham,  "Major  Calls  for  ERM  Reform,"  Financial  Times, 
September  20, 1992,  p. 1. 
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Flood and Peter M. Garber,4  relates speculative attacks to economic 
fundamentals. Countries experience balance-of-payments  crises be- 
cause they run  unsustainable  monetary  and fiscal policies or their  com- 
petitiveness otherwise deteriorates. Krugman's  own formulation  re- 
quires  current  policies to be inconsistent  with the exchange  rate  peg; we 
discuss a variant  of the model in which an attack  can occur even when 
current  policies are consistent with the peg, but future  policies are ex- 
pected with certainty  to shift in a direction  inconsistent  with its mainte- 
nance. 
The second model, following Flood and Garber5  and Maurice  Obst- 
feld,6  allows purely  self-fulfilling  speculative  attacks  to occur. In the ab- 
sence of an attack, monetary  policies remain unchanged  and the ex- 
change rate peg is maintained  forever. If and only if an attack occurs, 
monetary  policy will shift in a less restrictive  direction,  causing  the ex- 
change rate to depreciate. In the first model, the speculative attack 
merely anticipates  events that would eventually occur; in the second 
model, in contrast, the attack  provokes events that would not occur in 
its absence. For this model to be compelling,  there must be an intrinsic 
reason why monetary  policy would shift only in the event of an attack. 
As explained above, the Maastricht  treaty provides such a reason. It 
makes exchange rate stability  a precondition  for participation  in Euro- 
pean monetary  union. Once driven  out of the EMS, a country  could no 
longer  qualify  for EMU membership  and  hence would  no longer  have an 
incentive  to pursue  the policies of austerity  required  for entry.  The force 
of this explanation  is illustrated  by the behavior  of the United Kingdom, 
which, after  having  pursued  high  interest  rate  policies for more  than  two 
years, cut its discount rate in half as soon as it was driven out of the 
EMS-despite  no other  obvious change  in economic circumstances,  no 
change  in government,  and  not even a change  in the identity  of the Chan- 
cellor  of the Exchequer. 
In the second section of our  paper,  we review recent EMS history;  in 
the third, we analyze the requirements  for operating  pegged exchange 
rate  systems. We then  discuss four  distinct  explanations  for the Septem- 
ber 1992  crisis, working  from the simplest  to the increasingly  complex. 
The first  explanation,  considered  in the fourth  section, is that  persistent 
high  inflation  and  rising  labor  costs in some EMS countries  eroded  their 
4. Flood  and  Garber  (1984a). 
5. Flood  and  Garber  (1984b). 
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competitiveness and created balance-of-payments  problems. For the 
vast majority  of EMS countries, we find little support  for this view in 
the data. Except in Italy, there is little evidence that wage inflation  was 
inadequately  compensated  by increases  in labor  productivity. 
In the fifth  section, we analyze  a second explanation.  Starting  in 1990, 
EMS countries suffered a massive asymmetric shock: German eco- 
nomic and monetary  unification  (GEMU). While this explanation  also 
focuses on competitiveness, unlike its predecessor, it emphasizes that 
evidence of competitive  difficulties  will not be easy to detect in relative 
prices. As an asymmetric  shock, GEMU required  a change in relative 
prices and costs. Maintaining  the historical relationship  of unit labor 
costs between Germany  and  the rest of the EMS was not enough;  prices 
and costs in other EMS countries actually had to decline relative to 
those prevailing  in Germany.  We analyze  profitability  in manufacturing 
and  the current  account  of the balance  of payments  to ascertain  whether 
the requisite adjustment  took place; again, we conclude that in most 
cases it did. By the time  the crisis erupted,  most EMS  countries  had  suc- 
cessfully carried  out the changes  in relative  prices and  costs required  to 
maintain  their  EMS parities. 
The sixth  and  seventh  sections then  introduce  the two models  that  we 
believe best fit the facts: the Krugman  model with speculative attacks 
driven by inevitable  future policy shifts; and the Obstfeld  model with 
multiple  equilibria,  contingent  policy shifts, and self-fulfilling  attacks. 
Given four different  interpretations  of the crisis, it is natural  to ask 
foreign  exchange  traders  what they actually  thought.  Thus in the eighth 
section, we report  the results  of an extensive mail  questionnaire  admin- 
istered to European  foreign exchange dealers, which provides some 
support  for our interpretation.  The ninth section explains why govern- 
ments and central  banks  found it so costly to defend their  pegged  rates 
once speculative attacks were underway, while the tenth section as- 
sesses the political economy of the crisis from the German  Bundes- 
bank's  perspective. 
The  last two sections consider  options  for  the future.  We list the alter- 
natives for completing the transition to European monetary union. 
These include  attempting  to proceed  as before, but realigning  more  fre- 
quently;  arranging  a merger  between the Bundesbank  and the Bank of 
France;  establishing  an early two-speed EMU within  the framework  of 
the Maastricht  treaty;  and enhancing  exchange  rate  flexibility.  We con- Barty  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  55 
clude that none of these alternatives  is viable.7  This leaves the option 
of providing  pecuniary  disincentives  against  speculative  attacks. Either 
levying a Tobin tax on foreign exchange transactions  or requiring  pur- 
chasers  of foreign  exchange  to make  non-interest-bearing  deposits at the 
central bank would serve this purpose. It would thereby stabilize the 
EMS during  the transition.  Our  recommendation  is consistent with the 
provisions of the Single European  Act and the Maastricht  treaty. We 
recognize that both a Tobin tax and deposit requirements  have disad- 
vantages: they reduce the liquidity of the foreign exchange markets, 
which may discourage  foreign  investment  and hinder  efforts  to develop 
financial  markets.  But it is not enough to point to these disadvantages. 
Critics  must  also offer a viable alternative. 
The Three Stages of the New EMS 
EMS histories abound.  Most conclude around  1987  or so, however, 
immediately  before  the system was dramatically  transformed.  This sec- 
tion provides a capsule history of the new EMS, the modified  system 
that  came into operation  in 1987.  Our  account  distinguishes  three stages 
in its development.8 
No  Realignments  after 1987 
In the first phase of the new EMS, realignments  were eliminated. 
From  the inception  of the EMS  in 1979  through  January  1987,  there  were 
eleven realignments-more than one a year, on average. By contrast, 
from January 1987 until the 1992 crisis, no further  realignments  oc- 
7. One  seemingly  logical  option-floating exchange  rates-is  strongly  opposed  by Eu- 
ropeans,  a fact that  is not always  adequately  appreciated.  Their  resistance  results  in part 
from  the extent  of intra-European  trade,  which  renders  exchange  rate  fluctuations  costly. 
Previous  experiences  with  floating  rates,  like that  of the 1930s,  have left a particularly  bit- 
ter  taste  in  the mouths  of European  policymakers.  Moreover,  Europeans  fear  that  manipu- 
lation  of exchange  rates  would  represent  a threat  to the common  market  itself, for reasons 
we explain  below. History  also explains  why Europe  feels the need to firmly  anchor  Ger- 
many  in an  open  trade  and  payments  area;  to achieve  this  goal, a common  market  and  fixed 
exchange  rates  are  viewed  as essential. 
8. The term  "new  EMS"  was coined by Giavazzi  and Spaventa  (1990).  Portes  (1993) 
presents  an analysis  of these developments  that  parallels  our  own account. 56  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table 1. Exchange-Rate  Realignments  within  the EMS, 1979-87a 
Percent 
Date of  Deutsche  Dutch  French  Bel/Lux.  Italian  Danish  Irish 
realignmentt  mark  giilder  franc  franc  lira  kr  one  punt 
September  24, 1979  2.0  ...  ...  ...  ...  -2.9 
November  30, 1979  ...  ...  ..  .  ...  ...  -4.8  ... 
March  23, 1981  ...  ...  ...  ...  -6.0  ... 
October  5, 1981  5.5  5.5  -3.0  ...  -3.0  .. 
February  22, 1982  ...  .  ...  -8.5  ...  -3.0 
June 14, 1982  4.3  4.3  -5.8  ...  -2.8  ... 
March  21, 1983  5.5  3.5  -2.5  1.5  -2.5  2.5  -3.5 
July 22, 1985  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  -6.0  2.0  2.0 
April  7, 1986  3.0  3.0  -3.0  1.0  ...  1.0 
August  4, 1986  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -8.0 
January  12, 1987  3.0  3.0  ...  2.0  ...  .  .. 
Source: Fratianni  and von Hagen  (1992,  p. 22). 
a. The numbers  are percentage  changes  of a given  currency's  bilateral  central  rate  against  those currencies  whose 
bilateral  parities  were not realigned.  A positive  number  denotes  an appreciation,  a negative  number  a depreciation. 
On March  21, 1983,  and  on July  22, 1985,  all parities  were realigned. 
curred.  Table I presents  the dates of these realignments  and their  com- 
position.9 
The need for realignments  reflected  the persistence  of inflation  differ- 
entials across EMS countries.  Paul  De Grauwe  has noted that the stan- 
dard  deviation  of inflation  rates across EMS countries  actually  rose in 
the first  four years of the EMS, compared  to the preceding  period.  10  In- 
deed, inflation  differentials  in this period  were larger  across EMS coun- 
tries  than  across EC countries  that  did  not participate  in the system. The 
situation began to change in 1983, although inflation  differentials  re- 
mained substantial,  narrowing  only after 1987. Even thereafter,  how- 
ever, substantial  differentials  still remained  between Italy, the United 
Kingdom,  and Spain  on the one hand  and  Germany  on the other. 
By 1987,  it seemed  that  realignments  had  become a thing  of the past. 
9. A twelfth  realignment  on January  8, 1990  replaced  the Italian  lira's  wide band  with 
the narrow  EMS band  by leaving  the upper  limit  unchanged  and raising  the lower limit, 
thereby  effectively  raising  the central  rate  against  the DM  by 3.5 percent.  No change  in the 
actual  lira-DM  rate  was involved.  Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  (1989)  and  Gros  and  Thygesen 
(1992)  provide  short  histories  of the circumstances  surrounding  each realignment. 
10. De Grauwe  (1989). 
11. Whether  this change  reflected  a conscious  policy decision  is open to question.  In 
any case, there were notable  dissenters  from the no-realignment  strategy,  including  the 
German  Bundesbank.  See for example  Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1991,  p. 66). We return  to 
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What  led policymakers  to ignore continuing  inflation  differentials  and 
adopt  the no-realignment  strategy?  The answer is particularly  interest- 
ing in light  of the 1992  crisis. The January  1987  realignment,  the last one 
to occur under  the old EMS, was widely viewed as unprecedented.  It 
was attributed  not to imbalances  within  the EMS but to extraneous  fac- 
tors. The leading  culprits-a  declining  dollar  and self-fulfilling  specula- 
tive expectations-were  precisely the same as in 1992!  This interpreta- 
tion led to revisions of  EMS arrangements  designed to  strengthen 
intervention and encourage policy coordination (the Basle-Nyborg 
Agreement  of 1987).  12 Credit  facilities  were extended  for  longer  periods. 
For the first  time, countries  were permitted  to draw  on credits before a 
currency  reached  the limit of its EMS band. Imbued  by confidence  be- 
cause of these innovations, policymakers discarded the realignment 
option. 
No  Capital Controls after 1990 
Intervals  of exchange  rate stability  punctuated  by occasional  realign- 
ments  were possible because controls  protected  central  banks'  reserves 
against  speculative  attacks. Inflation  differentials  continued  to offer ex- 
change  market  participants  a one-way bet: given Italy's tendency  to run 
a looser monetary  policy than Germany,  for example, it was easy to an- 
ticipate that the lira would have to be devalued sooner or later. When 
the time came, huge quantities  of financial  capital  flowed  from Milan  to 
Frankfurt,  threatening  the Banca  d'Italia's  reserves and  the EMS itself. 
Capital  controls  provided  insulation  from  these pressures.  They allowed 
monetary  authorities  to retain some policy autonomy for limited pe- 
riods. Different  inflation  rates were thereby  reconciled  with pegged yet 
adjustable  exchange  rates. 
As table  2 shows, these controls  took a variety  of forms,  ranging  from 
taxes on holdings  of foreign  currency  assets to restrictions  on the ability 
of banks to lend abroad.  Controls  were eliminated  as an adjunct  to the 
1992  program  to complete the internal  market.  It was hardly  feasible to 
12. The Basle-Nyborg  Agreement,  while liberalizing  access to financing  facilities  for 
use in supporting  weak exchange  rates, in fact called  for undertaking  small  realignments 
more frequently,  perhaps  by shifting  the band  without  changing  the exchange rate dis- 
cretely, as with the 1990  realignment  of the lira. How this recommendation  came to be 
discarded  remains  an important  subject  for research. 58  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table 2.  Capital Controls for EMS Countries by Type of Transaction,  1988 
Type of controla 
Securities  Loans  Other 
Primary  Secondary  Trade  Deposit 
Country  market  market  related  Other  accounts  Other'b 
Belgiumc  F/A  F  F  F  F  F 
Denmark  F  F  A  A  A  A 
France  R/A  F  R  R  F/R  F 
Germany  F  F  F  F  F  F 
Ireland  A  F/R  F/A  F/A  F/P  F/P 
Italy  A/P  F/R  F/A  A  F/P  F/P 
Luxembourgc  F/A  F  F  F  F  F 
Netherlands  F  F  F  F  F  F 
United Kingdom  F  F  F  F  F  F 
Greece  A/P  A/P  A  A  R/P  R/P 
Portugal  R/A  R/A  A  A  A  A 
Spain  A  F/R  A  R/A  F/A  A 
Source: Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Co. (1988,  p. 5). 
a. The first  code refers  to capital  inflows,  while  the second  code refers  to outflows.  If only one code is listed, we 
infer  that  the code applies  to both  inflows  and  outflows.  The controls  are coded  as follows: 
F  = Free of controls. 
A = Subject  to authorization. 
R = Subject  to various  restrictions  as to maturity,  size, and use of funds. 
P  = Prohibited,  or subject  to authorization  that was usually  not granted. 
b. Includes  money  market  instruments  such as treasury  bills. 
c. A dual  exchange  market  was maintained. 
restrict  the freedom  of Italians  to open bank accounts in Germany,  for 
example, while eliminating  all controls  on intra-EC  movements  of port- 
folio capital and direct foreign investment-not  to mention labor and 
commodities. Hence controls were a casualty of the Single European 
Act, which mandated  their  elimination  by July 1, 1990  (except in Spain 
and Ireland,  which were exempted  until  December  31, 1992,  and Portu- 
gal and  Greece, which were exempted  until  December  31, 1995).13 Most 
EMS members  had removed their capital controls by the beginning  of 
1990, while Spain and Portugal  had significantly  relaxed their controls 
before  the crisis struck. 
For a time, the no realignment-no  controls strategy  seemed to work 
even in the face of persistent  inflation  differentials.  The question  is what 
tied down nominal  exchange rates when real exchange rates were di- 
verging. 
13. The Single  European  Act allows all EC countries  to resort  to emergency  controls 
for a period  of no more  than six months.  The Maastricht  treaty, however, rules that out 
completely  from  the beginning  of Stage II on January  1, 1994.  See the appendix  for more 
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No  Stability after 1991 
The answer,  as revealed  by the third  stage in the evolution  of the new 
EMS, was nothing  more than self-validating  expectations of continued 
stability. As soon as doubts began to surface, the viability of the new 
EMS was threatened. 
The lira  was the first  ERM  currency  to weaken in the second quarter 
of 1992.  Observers  cited a declining  U.S. dollar,  which  undermined  Ital- 
ian  international  competitiveness;  the possibility  of an extraordinary  tax 
on bank deposits and government  bonds; the country's large budget 
deficit; its high public debt; the ongoing government  crisis associated 
with the inconclusive debate over deficit reduction;  and the negative 
outcome of the Danish referendum  on Maastricht.  The Banca d'Italia 
intervened  extensively over the summer.  In the opening  days of Septem- 
ber, the currency  weakened  further.  A 1.75  point increase  in the Banca 
d'Italia's  discount  rate  on September  4 (which  brought  the rate  to 15  per- 
cent) and the government's  decision to seek emergency  powers bought 
a brief respite, but within a week the lira had crashed through  its ex- 
change  rate  mechanism  floor. 
Britain's exchange rate was also showing disturbing  symptoms. In 
the second week of July, sterling  fell to its lowest level against  the DM 
since the April 1992  election.14 The currency's weakness deepened in 
August.  Britain  reportedly  expended  at least $1.3 billion  of reserves that 
month  to keep sterling  from  falling  through  its floor  against  the DM. The 
first  week in September,  the Bank  of England  borrowed  $14.5 billion  of 
foreign  reserves to finance  further  intervention,  news of which allowed 
sterling  to recover temporarily.  '5 
On September  16, the Bank  of England  engaged  in massive interven- 
tion in support  of the pound, reportedly  expending  as much as $20 bil- 
lion, or half its total foreign  exchange reserves.  16 Its discount rate was 
raised  from 10  to 12  percent  and  a second increase  to 15  percent  was an- 
nounced. None of these measures sufficed. Hemorrhaging  reserves 
14. The dominant  explanation  in the press was that  the decline  of the dollar  rendered 
British  goods uncompetitive  against  their  U.S. substitutes.  See, for example,  Economist, 
September  19, 1992,  p. 31. 
15. Peter Norman,  James Blitz, and Tracy  Corrigan,  "UK Will Borrow  D-Marks  to 
Aid  ?," Financial  Times,  September  4, 1992,  p. 1, and  Peter  Norman,  "Positive  Response 
to Currency  Plan,"  Financial  Times,  September  4, 1992,  p. 22. 
16. "A  Ghastly  Game  of Dominoes,"  Economist,  September  19, 1992,  p. 89. 60  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
forced the government  to withdraw  sterling  from  the ERM  at the end of 
the day. Italy pulled  out later that night, and Spain  devalued  the peseta 
by 5 percent.  Portugal  devalued  by 6 percent  on November  22. (Simulta- 
neously, Spain shifted its ERM band  a second time, also by 6 percent, 
although  no discontinuous  devaluation  of the peseta occurred.)  Ireland 
devalued  in January,  and Spain  and Portugal  again  in May. 
Thus a period  of nearly  five years distinguished  by the absence of re- 
alignments  came to an ignominious  end, imparting  a painful  lesson to 
central  bankers  and politicians  who had thought  that the preconditions 
for European  monetary  union  were already  in place. 
Pegged But Adjustable Exchange Rates: 
The Necessary Conditions 
When the EMS was launched  in 1979,  few economists gave it much 
chance of surviving.  It not only survived  but grew and prospered.  It is 
worth considering, therefore, what this experience reveals about the 
preconditions for maintaining  pegged exchange rates. We focus on 
three:  the capacity  to undertake  relative  price  adjustments,  robust  mon- 
etary  rules, and  ability  to contain  market  pressures. 
The Capacity  to Undertake Relative  Price Adjustments 
Pegged  rate systems face difficulties  when significant  changes  are re- 
quired  in the relative  prices of domestic  and  foreign  goods, of traded  and 
nontraded  goods, and of labor and commodities. If nominal  exchange 
rate changes are not permitted, the response must occur through  the 
synchronous  adjustment  of numerous  wages and prices. If some wages 
and prices adjust  sluggishly,  transitional  output  losses may result. Ex- 
change rate changes can avert these losses by altering  many prices at 
once. This is the daylight  savings time argument  for exchange rate ad- 
justments. 
This perspective suggests that pegged exchange rates can be sus- 
tained  only if shocks requiring  frequent  and sizable  relative  price  adjust- 
ments  are infrequent;  if individual  wages and  prices adjust  smoothly;  or 
if changes  in nominal  exchange  rates  are  permitted  in the event of excep- 
tional  shocks. 
In practice,  the first  two conditions  have not been met, while  the third Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  61 
has been a feature  of all successful pegged rate systems. Such systems 
feature  escape clauses providing  for realignments  in the event of excep- 
tional shocks."7  The EMS as initially  designed, for example, explicitly 
provided  for realignments.  18 
The  theory  of escape clauses emphasizes  that  realignments  can  be un- 
dertaken  without  undermining  authorities'  commitment  to pegged  rates 
if they are  initiated  in response  to exceptional  shocks  that  can  be directly 
observed or otherwise independently  verified, and if those shocks are 
not instigated  by the authorities  themselves-that  is, if moral  hazard  is 
not a problem.  German  economic and monetary  union  is an example  of 
such a shock; as we document  below, the German  Bundesbank  argued 
that it was possible to realign  in response without undermining  confi- 
dence in the EMS. 
In contrast,  if the contingencies  that  trigger  the escape clause are pri- 
vate information,  the contingent  rule may lack credibility.'9  The gains 
from  possessing  an escape clause may  be outweighed  by the losses asso- 
ciated with the expectations of devaluation,  higher  interest rates, and 
inflationary  pressure engendered  by its existence. From this perspec- 
tive, the new EMS  was a gamble  in which  the authorities  traded  the third 
necessary condition for a viable exchange rate system (the escape 
clause)  for the added  credibility  of a fixed  rate,  in the hope  that  one of the 
other two necessary conditions  (infrequent  shocks or smooth  domestic 
adjustments)  would miraculously  arise. 
17. The theory  of escape clauses  has been  revived  recently  by Grossman  and  van Hu- 
yck (1988),  De Kock  and  Grilli  (1989),  Flood  and  Isard  (1989),  Obstfeld  (1992),  and  Giovan- 
nini  (1993). 
18. This  observation  raises  an important  question  about  life after  European  monetary 
unification:  what will substitute  for exchange rate changes in the event of exceptional 
shocks?  By now, an extensive literature  exists on the prospective  effects of EMU. Horn 
and  Persson  (1988)  suggest  that  EMU, by increasing  the credibility  of policymakers'  com- 
mitment  to price stability,  might  enhance  wage flexibility.  Similarly,  the Commission  of 
the European  Communities  (1990)  argues  that  EMU, by increasing  the credibility  of fiscal 
authorities'  commitment  not to bail  out depressed  regions,  will  encourage  workers  in such 
areas  to moderate  wage demands.  Bertola  (1988)  argues  that  once exchange  rates  are im- 
mutably  fixed, workers  will respond  by adjusting  on other  margins,  enhancing  wage  flexi- 
bility and interregional  migration.  The one empirical  study to date of these hypotheses 
(Blanchard  and  Muet, 1993)-a comparison  of wage flexibility  before  and  after  the initia- 
tion  of France'sfrancfort  policy-finds little  support  for them. While  the costs and  bene- 
fits  of monetary  unification  are  not the subject  of this  paper,  in the final  sections  we discuss 
the implications  of our  analysis  for European  monetary  union. 
19. Canzoneri  (1985). 62  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Robust Monetary Rules 
Because the credibility of a pegged rate system requires that ex- 
change  rate  changes  should  occur  only in response  to exceptional  distur- 
bances, realignments  resulting from self-fulfilling  speculative attacks 
must be ruled  out. A necessary condition  for precluding  such attacks  is 
to adopt  robust  monetary  rules. 
Later  in this paper, we describe  the conditions  under  which multiple 
equilibria  and self-fulfilling  speculative  attacks may exist in the foreign 
exchange  market.  At this stage, we simply  note that  there  are  conditions 
in which  a speculative  crisis can occur-even  though  monetary  policy is 
conspicuously consistent with balance-of-payments  equilibrium.  If in- 
vestors anticipate  that post-attack monetary policy will be loosened, 
then capital gains on foreign assets will be rationally  anticipated.  It is 
this ex post validation  that makes an attack  equilibrium  possible along- 
side a no-attack  equilibrium. 
Under these circumstances,  current  and past policies do not suffice 
to rule out balance-of-payments  crises; anticipated  future  policies mat- 
ter as well. The escape clause feature  of pegged rate systems-that  the 
parity  may be changed  if exceptional  shocks occur-is  compatible  with 
the credibility  of the peg only if changes  in monetary  and  exchange  rate 
policy do not occur under  other  circumstances.  Thus  a robust  monetary 
rule is one that precludes  a shift to more accommodating  policies in the 
presence of a speculative  attack  not grounded  in fundamentals. 
Such rules are our second necessary condition  for the viability  of a 
pegged rate system. The EMS prescription  that a country wishing to 
change its parity must obtain the agreement  of all other participating 
countries  on both  the principle  of the parity  change  and  its size functions 
as a mechanism  committing  countries  to the pursuit  of robust  monetary 
rules.20 
Ability to Contain Market Pressures 
A third necessary condition for the viability of a fixed rate system 
concerns central  bank  actions in the event of a crisis. If the markets  are 
20. This  collective  decisionmaking  rule  was in fact adopted  to avert  beggar-thy-neigh- 
bor policies, but evolved into a way of imposing  discipline  on inflation-prone  countries. 
Naturally,  it was abandoned  by the United  Kingdom  and  Italy  when  they suspended  their 
ERM  memberships. Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  63 
uncertain  as to whether  the authorities  are prepared  to follow a robust 
monetary  policy rule, they may test the authorities'  resolve by running 
on their  reserves. A government's  commitment  to follow a robust  policy 
may not be enough to stabilize the exchange rate if the government  is 
newly constituted  and the markets  are still uncertain  about  the govern- 
ment's intention.  This is an example  of the private  information  problem 
emphasized  by Matthew  B. Canzoneri.21 
A concerted effort is required  to defeat a speculative attack moti- 
vated  on these grounds.  One  way of doing  so is to raise  domestic  interest 
rates to such heights that the capital  gains accruing  on foreign  assets if 
a realignment  occurs are outweighed  by the return  on interest-bearing 
domestic  assets. Investors  then have no further  incentive  to test the au- 
thorities' resolve. But the maintenance  of stratospheric  interest rates 
may be painful,  as we explain  below. Central  banks seeking to contain 
market  pressures  may have to resort  to alternative  means. 
One alternative  is for strong-currency  countries  to intervene  in sup- 
port of weak currencies. This implies that they should accumulate  re- 
serves, which would appear  to be painless. But strong-currency  coun- 
tries fear that  unlimited  intervention  threatens  price stability  because it 
implies an increase in the monetary  base.22  Central  banks that commit 
to intervene  in unlimited  amounts  may renege when they perceive that 
domestic  price  stability  isjeopardized.  We show below that  this  problem 
has arisen  under  the EMS. 
Another way of containing  market  pressures is to resort to restric- 
tions on capital movements. Capital  controls, as an administrative  re- 
striction,  limit  the funds  that  can be legally  and  profitably  transferred  be- 
tween currencies over short periods.23  Such administrative  controls 
may be circumvented  eventually;  however, in the meantime,  they pre- 
vent the exhaustion of foreign reserves and abandonment  of the ex- 
change  rate peg. Even if the controls  protect the pegged rate for only a 
21. Canzoneri  (1985). 
22. This is not the case when intervention  is sterilized,  but sterilized  intervention  is 
widely  regarded  as ineffectual;  see Obstfeld  (1988).  For  a recent  view to the contrary,  how- 
ever, see Catte,  Galli,  and  Rebecchini  (1992). 
23. This is formally  analyzed  in Wyplosz  (1986).  With  capital  controls,  a speculative 
attack  is of bounded  size per  unit  of time.  Hence, there  exists a volume  of foreign  exchange 
reserves  (possibly  augmented  by foreign  loans)  that is sufficient  to support  the fixed rate 
regime.  As we explain  below, it would  also be possible  to use nonadministrative  measures 
such  as taxes on foreign  exchange  transactions  to achieve  the same  effect. 64  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1  993 
few days, this can provide  precious scope for organizing  an orderly  re- 
alignment  (which  under  EMS rules  requires  extensive consultation)  and 
hence for insuring  the survival  of the system. 
To sum up, the three conditions that we cited as necessary for a 
pegged rate system-the  capacity to undertake  relative price adjust- 
ments, robust  monetary  rules, and  ability  to contain  market  pressures- 
characterized  the European  monetary  system as initially  designed but 
were eliminated  under  the new EMS. Ruling  out realignments-what- 
ever the anti-inflationary  benefits in weak-currency countries-has 
made relative  price changes more difficult  to effect. Eliminating  capital 
controls-whatever the virtues  in terms  of resource  allocation-has left 
central  banks  bereft  of protection  from  attacks.  The desire  to qualify  for 
monetary  union provided  countries  with the incentive to adopt robust 
policy rules consistent with the maintenance  of fixed rates. Once the 
prospects  for European  monetary  union  dimmed,  however, speculative 
attacks  proved  impossible  to rebuff.  The EMS became unstable. 
Overt Competitiveness  Problems 
The simplest-and hence most popular-explanation for the Septem- 
ber  crisis is that  it resulted  from  competitiveness  problems.  In this view, 
certain  countries  experienced  persistent  inflation  and  rising  labor  costs, 
which undermined  the competitiveness of their traded-goods  sectors. 
The markets identified  these countries and attacked their currencies 
once devaluation  was overdue.24 
From  this perspective,  the countries  whose exchange  rates  have been 
shaken since September  fall into three categories. In the first is Italy, 
which shows clear signs  of deteriorating  competitiveness.  Strikingly,  It- 
aly was the first EMS country to suffer  foreign exchange market  diffi- 
culties in the summer  and autumn  of 1992.  Thus, we conclude that sim- 
ple competitive  problems  played a part-but  only a limited  one-in  the 
September  crisis. 
The second category  includes Spain  and the United Kingdom  (along 
with two countries outside the EMS, Sweden and Finland). Although 
they too suffered  foreign  exchange  crises in September,  the evidence on 
24. For  an  official  expression  of this  view, see Commission  of the European  Communi- 
ties (1993). Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  65 
competitiveness is more ambiguous.  Some indicators  suggest a prob- 
lem, while others do not. In the third  category  are the other EMS coun- 
tries that experienced exchange rate difficulties-France,  Belgium, 
Denmark,  and  Ireland-none of which showed significant  signs of dete- 
riorating  competitiveness.25 
We present three competitiveness  measures  for each country:  bilat- 
eral  unit  labor  costs relative  to Germany,  multilateral  relative  unit  labor 
costs adjusted  for the business cycle, and the ratio of traded to non- 
traded  goods prices at home.26 
Figure  1  focuses on Italy, the only EMS  country  that shows unambig- 
uous evidence of deteriorating  international  competitiveness. The unit 
labor  cost indexes in figure  1 indicate  a loss of competitiveness  of some 
20 percent for Italy since 1988.  This is confirmed  by the decline in the 
ratio  of traded  to nontraded  goods prices. 
Figures 2 and 3 examine Spain and the United Kingdom, the two 
other EMS countries  that present some indication  of competitive diffi- 
culties (although  the evidence is not clear). In the case of Spain,  real ex- 
change rates, whether measured  by labor costs or the price ratio be- 
tween traded  and nontraded  goods, depict a massive real appreciation 
from  the 1987  trough.  One  would  expect a trend  in this direction  because 
of the Balassa-Samuelson  effect, however.27  Because Spain  was grow- 
ing rapidly  during  the period, this qualification  renders  the evidence for 
that  country  difficult  to interpret. 
There may also be some evidence of overvaluation  for the United 
Kingdom.  Interpretation  of that  evidence is complicated  by the fact that 
25. Limitations  of the data  for Portugal  prevented  us from  undertaking  a comparable 
analysis,  but  the data  that  exist suggest  that  Portugal  also falls into  this last category. 
26. We  measure  bilateral  unit  labor  costs by converting  each country's  unit  labor  costs 
in domestic  currency  into  deutsche  marks  using  the period  average  exchange  rate.  We pre- 
fer this measure  to the multilateral  one on the grounds  that  the latter  is dominated  by fluc- 
tuations  in the U.S. dollar.  The multilateral  unit  labor  cost measure  is based on the IMF 
index. In that index, the trade  weights  are a function  of the shares  of the sixteen foreign 
countries  in the subject  country's  imports  and  exports, their  relative  shares  in third  mar- 
kets, and  the openness  of their  manufacturing  sectors. It would  not be appropriate,  there- 
fore, to construct  bilateral  unit  labor  cost comparisons  relative  to Germany  by dividing  the 
IMF index for the subject  country  by the IMF index for Germany  because the two use 
different  weights. As a measure  of the relative  price of traded  and nontraded  goods, we 
use the ratio  of wholesale  price  to consumer  price  indexes. 
27. The Balassa-Samuelson  effect is the tendency  for the price level to be higher  in 
high-income  countries  because  of the relatively  high  price  of nontraded  goods. The same 
point  applies  to Italy, albeit  to a lesser extent. 66  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure  1. Competitiveness  Measures  for Italy, 1979-92 
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Figure  2.  Competitiveness  Measures  for Spain, 1979-92 










1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:1  1988:1  1990:1  1992:1 








70  , I  I  I  I  I 
1980:1H  1982:1H  1984:1H  1986:1H  1988:1H  1990:1H  1992:1H 








1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:1  1988:1  1990:1  1992:1 
Source: Same  as figure  1, except the index  of traded  to nontraded  goods uses data from  International  Financial 
Statistics. 68  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 3.  Competitiveness Measures for the United Kingdom, 1979-92 
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the real appreciation  predates  Britain's  entry into the ERM in October 
1990.  (Sterling  did, however, shadow  the ERM  from 1987  onward.)  The 
behavior  of relative  labor  costs suggests that improvements  were actu- 
ally underway  since entry. This observation  creates some difficulty  for 
those who argue  that  Britain's  crisis  was a product  of the decision to  join 
the ERM  at an overvalued  rate. 
Sweden and Finland,  while not ERM members,  can be placed in this 
category  as well. Finland  suffered  a massive shock because of the col- 
lapse of its Soviet trade;  this required  radical  adjustments  of the prices 
and costs of Finnish  exports, which had to be redirected  toward  other 
markets.  Sweden  felt the repercussions  of problems  in neighboring  Fin- 
land (with which it competed  in products  such as timber  and nminerals) 
and encountered  difficulties  in other markets,  as well.28  Both countries 
were grappling  with widening  budget  deficits  and serious  banking  prob- 
lems. The labor  cost indexes for Sweden in figure  4 suggest  that  a major 
deterioration  had  occurred  in the late 1980s;  however, a reversal  was un- 
derway starting  in 1990,  which should  have reassured  foreign  exchange 
market  participants.  In contrast, the price ratio of traded  to nontraded 
goods shows no sign of recovery. 
Figure  5 for Finland  makes  clear  that  a dramatic  adjustment  of wages 
and costs had taken place by 1992. But the magnitude  of the Soviet 
shock makes  it difficult  to know whether  these adjustments  sufficed. 
Figures  6 through  8 show these same competitiveness  measures  for 
Denmark,  France, and Ireland,  which also suffered  attacks  on their  ex- 
change rates starting  in September.  No sign of competitive  difficulties 
appears  in any of these countries,  aside from  the disquieting  behavior  of 
Danish  unit  labor  costs. And  the rise in Danish  unit  labor  costs, centered 
around  the mid-1980s,  leveled off after 1986.  There is little evidence of 
deterioration  since that  time. 
On balance, we conclude that the divergent  movement  of prices and 
labor costs played a part-but  a limited one-in  the September  crisis. 
This is an indictment  of the no-devaluation  policies of the new EMS (or 
of the macroeconomic  policies followed by some of the participating 
countries). But this indictment  is not universal. Aside from Italy and, 
28. As the Financial  Times  reported,  "Many  investors  also consider  the krona  heavily 
overvalued  against  the D-Mark.  Sweden's export performance  in recent  years has been 
poor  and  there  are no signs  of an immediate  improvement."  James  Blitz, "Central  Banks 
Move  to Ease Strain  of the D-Mark,"  Financial  Times,  August  21, 1992,  p. 2. 70  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 4.  Competitiveness Measures for Sweden, 1979-92 
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Figure  5. Competitiveness  Measures  for Finland,  1979-92 
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Figure 6.  Competitiveness Measures for Denmark,  1979-92 
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Figure 7.  Competitiveness Measures for France, 1979-92 
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arguably,  Spain and the United Kingdom, support  for the simple com- 
petitiveness  explanation  of the crisis is hardly  overwhelming. 
German Unification  and Hidden Competitiveness  Problems 
Even if relative unit labor costs in Germany  and its EMS partner 
countries diverged only slightly, the latter still could have suffered com- 
petitive difficulties because  of the asymmetric  GEMU  shock.  German 
unification necessitated  a decline in prices and costs in other EMS coun- 
tries relative  to  those  prevailing  in Germany.  That prices  and  costs 74  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 8.  Competitiveness Measures for Ireland,  1979-92 






60  - 
1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:1  1988:1  1990:1  1992:1 




115  - 
110 
105 - 
100 /  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 






1980:1  1982:1  1984:1  1986:1  1988:1  1990:1  1992:1 
Source: See figure  1. Irish  bilatemal  unit  labor  costs are plotted  annually. Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  75 
evolved in parallel  in Germany  and  other  EMS countries  does not there- 
fore absolve other EMS members  of the charge  of inadequate  competi- 
tiveness. 
We  develop this point  with  a simple  model  of the relative-price  effects 
of German  economic  and  monetary  unification,  and  show how the requi- 
site changes can be brought  about under different exchange rate ar- 
rangements. 
Modeling  German Unification 
The instantaneous  absorption  by the Federal Republic of another 
country  almost half its geographical  size and one-quarter  of its popula- 
tion was bound to affect economic conditions profoundly.  Most early 
analyses concluded  that an appreciation  of the DM (a fall in prices and 
costs in other EMS countries relative to those prevailing  in Germany) 
would  be required  in response  to the shock.29  A demand-side  view noted 
that public  and private  spending  rose considerably  in the wake of unifi- 
cation.30  Public spending  was spurred  by the need for investment  in in- 
frastructure  and the rise in unemployment  compensation.  The surge in 
private  spending  in the East reflected  consumption  smoothing  in antici- 
pation  of real  wage gains. In the absence of a commensurate  supply-side 
response, the pressure  on home goods could only be accommodated  by 
a real  appreciation.  A complementary  supply-side  approach  stressed  the 
existence of high-return  investments  in the East.31  This placed upward 
pressure  on real  interest  rates  in Germany,  attracting  capital  inflows  and 
inducing  a real  appreciation. 
Standard  textbook models correctly predicted the macroeconomic 
consequences  of the shock and  pointed  to the requisite  adjustments.  To 
drive  home this point, we employ  a simple  two-country  model  in the tra- 
dition  of Mundell-Fleming: 
29. Typically  these studies  focused on the exchange  rate change  needed  in the short 
run, largely neglecting  long-run  aspects. An exception is a paper by Begg and others 
(1990),  which  suggested  that  it might  be necessary  in the long  run  for  the DM  to depreciate 
to create a market  for the additional  German  exports needed to service the foreign  debt 
accumulated  in the short  run. The point  is formally  developed  in Wyplosz  (1991).  Given 
our  concern  with  the events of 1992,  we focus here  on the short  run. 
30. See Begg  and  others  (1990)  and  Burda  (1990). 
31. See Siebert  (1991)  and  Neumann  (1992). 76  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Germany  Other EMS Countries 
(1)  m -  p  =  ay  -  bi  m* -  p*  =  ay*  -  bi* 
(2)  y =  hq -  kr +  u  y* =  hq* -  kr* 
(3)  r=  i-  p  r* =*  -  p* 
(4)  p=cy  p*  =cy* 
(5)  q=  e  +  p*  -  p 
(6)  i =i*  +  e, 
where all variables  are in logs except for the real and nominal  interest 
rates (r and i respectively). Asterisks denote foreign  countries  (for cur- 
rent purposes, the rest of the EMS), and dots over variables  represent 
derivatives  with respect to time. Equations  1 and 2 describe  money and 
goods market equilibria  where m is the money supply, p is the price 
level, q is the real exchange rate, and a, b, h and k are parameters. 
Output  y denotes the deviation  from  trend.  The unification  shock (equiv- 
alently, a positive demand  or negative supply shock) is represented  by 
pi;  for analytical  simplicity,  we model pi  as permanent.32  Equation  3 de- 
fines  the real  interest  rate  in Germany  and  the rest of the EMS. Equation 
4 is a naive Phillips  curve, where c is a parameter.33  Equation  5 defines 
Germany's real exchange rate relative to the other EMS countries. 
Equation  6 represents  full capital  mobility,  as in the new EMS (where e 
is the domestic  currency  price of a unit  of foreign  exchange). 
If z = p  -  p* is the difference between  price levels  in Germany and 
the rest of EMS, then the system simplifies  to 
(7)  q  =  3[2hq(a -  bc)  +  z  -  (m  -  m*)  +  ii(a  -  bc)],  and 
(8)  z  =  3[2hbcq -  kcz  +  kc(m  -  m*)  +  bcii], 
where the coefficient I is assumed  to be positive.34 
32. The shock  might  also be modeled  as temporary,  as in Wyplosz  (1991).  But this ex- 
tension  would  not  alter  in any  significant  way  the short-run  responses  upon  which  we focus 
here. Similarly,  we neglect  feedbacks  through  net exports  without  loss of generality. 
33. Adding  expectations  would  enrich  the dynamics  and  complicate  the presentation 
without  substantively  affecting  the conclusions. 
34. The coefficient  ,B  = [b + k(a -  bc)]- I must  be positive  for the system comprised 
of equations  7 and  equation  8 to be saddle-path  stable.  We  assume  this  to be the case in the 
following  discussion.  As usual, we treat  the exchange  rate  as the nonpredetermined  vari- 
able  and  the price  level as the sticky  predetermined  variable. Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  77 
If in response to the unification  shock (when 1i becomes positive) 
money supplies  m and m* remain  unchanged,  the long-run  equilibrium 
is reestablished  when q falls by ,u12h  with z = 0. When  exchange rates 
are  allowed  to float,  this is also the short-run  equilibrium  as the deutsche 
mark  appreciates  by ,u12h  on impact.  Price levels in Germany  and other 
countries  do not have to move. Output  rises in the same proportion  in 
both countries, perfectly spreading  the unification  shock across them. 
(If Germany  reduces m to prevent its price level from rising, with m* 
unchanged,  a stronger  initial  appreciation  will occur, followed by a de- 
cline of prices in Germany  relative  to those in the rest of the EMS.) 
The same outcome can be achieved within the EMS so long as the 
deutsche mark  is revalued  at the time of unification.  Thereafter,  prices 
and  output  evolve in parallel  in Germany  and  other  EMS countries. Ex- 
change  rate  flexibility  is needed  only once, when the shock  occurs. If the 
new parity  is chosen correctly,  there  is no need for further  realignment. 
The Conflict 
Aware of market  pressures for an appreciation  of its currency, the 
Bundesbank  apparently  desired a realignment  of the DM as early as 
1989. Revaluing the DM within the EMS requires the unanimous 
agreement  of ERM countries, however. France, pledged to its franc 
fort, vetoed any change  in its parity  relative  to the DM. Britain,  which 
had  just entered  the ERM, argued  that  a downward  realignment  against 
the DM would undermine  the credibility  of its monetary  strategy. The 
Bundesbank's  preference  for a realignment  was rejected,  apparently  re- 
peatedly. 
Assuming  that the commitment  not to realign  was credible,  domestic 
and foreign  interest rates should have been equalized. (This is not far- 
fetched for the main EMS countries  in 1990-91;  figure  9 shows that by 
1991,  French  and  German  long-term  interest  rates had  more  or less con- 
verged.)  With  i = i*, equation  7 simplifies  to 
(9)  (1 -  kc)q =  -  2hcq  -  c>i. 
Although  realignment  was ruled  out, the real  appreciation  (which  still 
had to ultimately  equal ,u12h)  could only be achieved by increasing  the 
level of German  prices  relative  to price  levels in other  EMS countries.  It 
is worth noting that, according  to equation  9, the evolution of the real 
exchange  rate  and  therefore  relative  inflation  rates  is independent  of the 78  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 9.  Long-Term Interest Rates in Europe,  1987-92 
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monetary  policies pursued  by Germany  and the rest of the EMS. Simi- 
larly, equation  10  shows that  the ratio  of output  in Germany  and  the rest 
of the EMS does not depend  on the policies chosen: 
(10)  y  -  y*  =  [13/(1 -  P3ak)][2bhq  +  b,iu. 
Yet output  and  price  levels are affected  by policy actions, creating  an 
unavoidable  conflict of interest. The real appreciation  required  to ac- 
commodate  unification  can be achieved with many different  combina- 
tions of price  inflation  in Germany  and  the rest of the EMS. Feasible  op- 
tions  include  a burst  of inflation  in Germany  and  stable  prices  elsewhere, 
a constant  price  level in Germany  and  a burst  of deflation  elsewhere, and 
moderate  inflation  in Germany  combined  with moderate  deflation  else- 
where. But, as in any fixed rate system, monetary  policies in Germany 
and  in the rest of the EMS cannot  be set independently. 
France and other countries may have thought  that, by denying the 
Bundesbank  its request  for a realignment,  they could force it to adopt  a 
more expansionary  monetary  policy, thereby eliminating  the need for Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  79 
contractionary  policies elsewhere in  the  EMS.35 For its  part, the 
Bundesbank  did not conceal its desire to check inflation  at home even 
if doing so implied  disinflation  elsewhere. If we model Germany  as the 
Stackelberg  leader and assume that the rest of the EMS adjusts  mone- 
tary  policy to peg its DM rate,  we can combine  equation  9 with  equations 
1 through  4 to obtain 
(11)  P =  c3(bhq  -  kp +  km +  b,u). 
The implications  of equations  9 and 11 are shown in figure  10.36 The 
real exchange  rate  must appreciate  from q0  to q1  in the long run. If Ger- 
many's money supply  remains  unchanged,  the system moves over time 
from  A to B: the required  real  appreciation  is achieved through  inflation 
in Germany  caused  by excess demand  (or, equivalently,  inadequate  sup- 
ply). The price level in the rest of the EMS may rise or fall.37  If instead 
Germany  uses its leadership  to insure  domestic price stability,  the new 
long-run  equilibrium  is D. The real appreciation  is now accomplished 
through  disinflation  and  recession in the rest of the EMS. Because other 
EMS countries  peg their  currencies  to the DM, they import  Germany's 
tight  monetary  policy.38  A conflict  was thus unavoidable  once the Bun- 
desbank reaffirmed  its commitment  to check inflation  and the other 
EMS countries  confirmed  their  unwillingness  to realign. 
The Outcome 
The implication  of this model is that stable relative prices were not 
enough. Prices and costs in other  EMS countries  had  to decline relative 
to those prevailing  in Germany.  As shown in figure 11, the other EMS 
countries in fact succeeded in reducing  their inflation  rates relative to 
Germany's. 
35. An attempt  to do so was made  in October  1991.  French  short-term  interest  rates 
were brought  below German  levels in the hope that the Bundesbank  would respond  by 
adjusting  German  rates  in the same  direction.  This  did  not occur;  the French  move had  to 
be reversed  promptly  as capital  began  to flow  out. 
36. The system is dynamically  stable. Once the exchange  rate  is fixed, dynamics  are 
provided  by the sluggish  adjustment  of domestic  currency  prices. 
37. Here the behavior  of prices  depends  on the sign  of (bh -  k)  alone. This  would  not 
be the case in a model  with  output  spillovers  factored  into equation  2. 
38. Indeed,  the Bundesbank  might  pursue  an  even more  contractionary  policy,  forcing 
more  radical  disinflation  on other  EMS  countries  and  shifting  the new long-run  equilibrium 
to a point  such  as C. 80  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure  10. The Long-Run  German  Real Exchange  Rate and Monetary  Policy  Options 
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Without  an empirically  calibrated  version of the model, it is difficult 
to say whether  the observed changes in relative  prices were enough. A 
way around  this problem  is to focus on the quantities  that  relative  prices 
affect. The GEMU shock, as an increase in German  spending, should 
have  driven  up the prices of goods produced  and  consumed  in Germany 
relative  to those produced  and  consumed  abroad.  As an increase  in Ger- 
man investment relative to German  saving, it should have weakened 
Germany's  current  account and strengthened  those of its EMS trading 
partners.  As an increase in German  demand  for the goods of its EMS 
trading  partners, it should have enhanced profitability  in other EMS 
countries.  If other countries' current  accounts in fact weakened, then Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  81 
Figure 11.  Inflation in EMS Countries, 1987:1-1992:4 
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the prices of their  goods must have fallen insufficiently  (or risen exces- 
sively) relative  to the price of German  goods. Similarly,  if the profitabil- 
ity of their  manufacturing  sectors deteriorated  rather  than  strengthened, 
price discipline outside Germany  must have been inadequate.  Absent 
the requisite  relative  price movements, other  countries  would have had 
to push up their  nominal  rates along  with Germany's  in order  to restrict 
domestic demand  and maintain  external  balance, reinforcing  the nega- 
tive trend  in domestic  profitability. 
We therefore examined the profit share in manufacturing  (where 
available)  and the current  account of the balance  of payments.3 Italy's 
deteriorating  current  account  and business profitability  confirm  our hy- 
pothesis of a competitiveness problem. The evidence for the United 
Kingdom  is as ambiguous  as before;  while the profitability  measure  sug- 
gests an improvement  in competitiveness  since ERM  entry, the current 
account shows a relapse in 1992. In the case of Spain, the profit  share 
holds up nicely after 1988  despite the rise in labor  costs, consistent with 
the arguments  of those who would minimize competitive difficulties. 
For Finland  and Sweden, profits  and the current  account both suggest 
that, by 1992,  adjustment  to earlier  difficulties  was underway.  In none 
of the other countries experiencing  an attack (France, Belgium, Den- 
mark,  and Ireland)  does evidence of serious  problems  appear. 
39. The underlying  data  are presented  in Wyplosz  and  Eichengreen  (1993). 82  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
By the fall of 1992, then, adjustment  to the GEMU shock was well 
underway.  Competitive  disequilibria  were being  corrected.  Even taking 
into account the effects of the GEMU shock on equilibrium  relative 
prices and costs, we conclude-like  Richard  Portes40-that while com- 
petitiveness problems  cannot be dismissed (aside from Italy and possi- 
bly Spain  and the United Kingdom)  it is difficult  to find  firm  support  for 
them, even when one focuses on data that take into account the asym- 
metric  GEMU shock. 
In addition,  there is the troubling  fact of timing.  German  unification 
occurred  in 1990,  but the EMS crisis occurred  in 1992.  Markets  are for- 
ward-looking;  traders make profits if  they  succeed in  anticipating 
events. It seems peculiar  that the imbalances  set in motion  by German 
unification  should  have destabilized  EMS parities  more than two years 
after the fact, and not earlier.  The Spanish  peseta, for one, was at the 
top of its EMS band  only days before  it was attacked.  If the markets  per- 
ceived that competitiveness  problems  were evolving over time, traders 
should have begun to sell pesetas in anticipation  of future  difficulties, 
driving  the currency  toward  the bottom  of its band  before the fact. This 
did not occur. 
Inevitable Policy Shifts 
In fact, markets  may have been more sophisticated-not less-than 
we have so far given them credit. Even if current  policies were consis- 
tent  with the maintenance  of ERM  parities,  the markets  could  have been 
anticipating  a shift in future  policies. The policies of austerity  required 
to defend prevailing  parities gave rise to growing unemployment,  as 
shown in figure 12. As unemployment  rose, the political or economic 
cost of maintaining  those policies may  have grown  too heavy  for govern- 
ments  and  their  constituencies  to bear.  Anticipating  the inevitable,  trad- 
ers may have sold the currencies  of these countries before the policy 
shift occurred. 
Considerable  informal  evidence is consistent with this view. Euro- 
pean unemployment  was high and rising on the eve of the crisis. The 
budgetary  austerity required  to meet the convergence criteria  forced 
40.  Portes (1993). Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  83 
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governments  to implement  painful  measures of fiscal austerity, which 
elicited howls of protest. The Spanish  government  proposed  reductions 
in the rate  of unemployment  benefits,  for example, provoking  labor  un- 
rest. In Britain,  intense  criticism  was levied against  the decision  to main- 
tain high  interest  rates  in the face of an incipient  recession. 
To analyze this explanation  more systematically,  we use a one-coun- 
try  version  of the model  presented  above (with  no unification  shock). All 
variables  are defined  as before. 
(12)  m -  p = ay -  bi, 
(13)  y = h(e -  p) -  kr, 
(14)  i=  r +  , 
(15)  p =cy,  and 
(16)  i=  i* +  e. 
Because we assume  that  the country  is small, the foreign  price  level and 
interest  rate are taken as constant and normalized  to zero. The model 
reduces  to 
(17)  e =  P[ah(e  -  p)  +  (I  -  kc)(p -  m)], and 
(18)  P =  Pc[bh(e -  p)  -  k(p -  m)]. 84  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
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Figure 13 represents  the long-run  equilibrium  with a money supply 
m0 and  an associated stable  convergence  path  SoSo.4'  The money supply 
remains  unchanged  so long as no disturbance  occurs. The system rests 
at point  A with a pegged  exchange  rate  e0 =  m0 if policy is not expected 
to change.  In this equilibrium,  the exchange  rate  corresponds  to the fun- 
damental  in0. 
41. As in the case of the German  unification  shock, we assume  that ,B  = lb + k(a - 
bc)]-V'  is positive so that the system is saddle-path  stable. We treat  the exchange  rate  as 
the  nonpredetermined  variable  and  the price  level as the predetermined  variable.  The  con- 
vergence  path  is shown  as downward-sloping,  which occurs if 1 >  kc + ah. None of the 
conclusions  is affected  in the case in which 1 < kc + ah and the convergence  path  is up- 
ward-sloping. Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  85 
In contrast,  the expectation  that  at a future  date monetary  policy will 
be relaxed  from  mo  to ml implies  long-run  equilibrium  at point D. When 
the markets  realize that policy will change, they attack the currency. 
This attack  exhausts  the authorities'  foreign  exchange  reserves, forcing 
them to abandon  the exchange rate peg. This attack occurs before the 
shift  in monetary  policy itself. Indeed, it may occur as soon as the mar- 
kets become aware that monetary  policy will change;  otherwise unex- 
ploited profit  opportunities  would exist. The period of floating  begins 
with a depreciation  that  causes ajump from  A to B. Although  the mone- 
tary authorities  initially keep the money supply unchanged  at mo, the 
knowledge that it will be raised subsequently  to ml weakens the ex- 
change rate immediately. Following the jump depreciation, the ex- 
change rate continues to depreciate  along the path BC. Point C repre- 
sents the instant when the money supply is  increased to  ml, just 
preceding  the last phase in the transition  along  the path CD. 
Our third model of the September  crisis thus considers it a conse- 
quence  of market  anticipations  of an inevitable  shift  in monetary  policies 
provoked  by rising  unemployment.  A complete  analysis  of this explana- 
tion must recognize that governments,  in deciding whether to shift to 
less restrictive  policies, weighed the benefits  as well as the costs of the 
prevailing  regime. The costs were associated with unemployment;  the 
benefits  were associated with qualifying  for monetary  union. Thus any- 
thing  that reduced  the likelihood  that these benefits  would still exist in 
the future  should  have influenced  the calculations  of monetary  authori- 
ties and  governments. 
An implication  of this trade-off  is that the stability  of exchange  rates 
should  be correlated  with the prospects  for European  monetary  union. 
This was clearly the case in 1992.  The weakness of the lira dated from 
the day the negative  outcome  of the Danish  referendum  was known.  The 
lira,  the British  pound,  the Danish  krone,  and  the French  franc  all fell on 
June  3, the first  trading  day after  the referendum.  The Danish  nej was a 
surprise;  it had not been forecast by the opinion  polls. Initially,  reports 
stated  that  legal experts saw no way that the Maastricht  treaty, or even 
parts  of it, could be approved  and enacted by only eleven EC member- 
states.42  Doubts were compounded by press reports that confusion 
42. The main  factor disturbing  the lawyers was that the Maastricht  agreement  is an 
amendment  to the Treaty  of Rome and is bound  by Article  236 of that treaty, which re- 
quires  unanimous  approval  by all member-states. 86  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
about  the treaty's  viability  would  stoke German  concerns  about  the wis- 
dom  of pressing  ahead  with European  monetary  union. Italian  business- 
men voiced fears that the Danish rejection  would undermine  Italy's re- 
solve to comply  with  the convergence  criteria  laid  down  at Maastricht.43 
Ireland's  ratification  of the treaty  on June 18 did little to change the 
outlook. The lira did strengthen slightly once the Irish results were 
known. But uncertainty  remained  about  the outcome of the French  ref- 
erendum in September  and the implications  of the Danish  nej.44  Until 
these questions were resolved, traders pondered three possible out- 
comes: that Maastricht  would collapse, that eleven of the twelve EC 
states would go ahead with EMU, or that there would be a two-speed 
Europe in which some states would unite their currencies  and others 
would  not.45 
In August, French opinion  polls perturbed  the markets  on a regular 
basis. On Wednesday  the fifth, for example, the DM rose against  other 
European  currencies  as traders  anticipated  the release  of a negative  poll- 
ing result  later  in the day. As it turned  out, the poll indicated  that a slim 
majority  of French  voters favored  the treaty, "but  the result  proved too 
inconclusive  for most dealers, and the German  currency  drifted  further 
upwards."46 
The turnaround  occurred  on Tuesday, August 25, when for the first 
time a poll predicted  a slim rejection  of the treaty, by a margin  of 51 to 
49 percent.47  Sterling  fell to within one-half  pfennig of its floor against 
the DM as "the  prospect  of European  monetary  union  collapsing  has be- 
43. On German  doubts, see Quentin  Peel, "Bonn  Anxious that German  Doubts on 
EMU May Grow,"  Financial Times,  June  4, 1992,  p. 4. On Italian  concerns, see Robert 
Graham,  "Italian  Business Fears Loss of Resolve,"  on p. 5 of the same issue. As Robert 
Graham  reported,  "Ever  since the Danes rejected  the treaty  in a referendum  at the begin- 
ning of the month, businessmen  and bankers  have been concerned  that the process of 
closer European  integration  would  be slowed and the resolve of the Italian  authorities  to 
tackle  the country's  deteriorating  public  finances  would  be weakened."  "Italian  Banks  In- 
crease  Prime  Rate  to 14  Percent,"  Financial  Times,  June  23, p. 2. 
44. France's  referendum  was called by President  Mitterrand  in the aftermath  of the 
Danish  rejection.  He calculated  (incorrectly)  that  a strong  oui would  relaunch  the process. 
45. See James  Blitz, "D-Mark  Firm  Despite EMU Vote,"  Financial Times,  June  20- 
21, 1992,  p. 13. 
46. James  Blitz, "Sterling/D-Mark  Hits New Low,"  Financial  Times,  August  6, 1992, 
p.28. 
47. Alice Rawsthorn,  "French  Support  for Union Drops,"  Financial Times,  August 
26, 1992,  p.1. Bariy Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  87 
come a strong incentive for investing in D-Marks."48  Another poll on 
August  28, with an even larger  negative  margin  (53  percent),  pushed  the 
lira through  its floor against  the DM and led to weakness in other EMS 
currencies.49  On August 31, Commission President Jacques Delors 
threatened  to resign  if the French  rejected  the treaty,  warning  that  a neg- 
ative vote would  jeopardize  European  unity itself; the pound, lira, and 
French  franc  continued  to slide.50 
We can more  systematically  analyze  the impact  of these events on ex- 
pectations  by examining  the behavior  of forward  exchange  rates. Figure 
14  displays  daily data  on spot rates, one-year-ahead  forward  rates, and 
EMS bands. The data  for Italy  are  graphic  reminders  of the shaky  credi- 
bility of the lira's EMS peg. From 1987  through  early 1989,  the forward 
rate  was consistently  below the bottom  of the band.  In contrast  to other 
EMS currencies, the forward  rate was again below the bottom of the 
band  at the beginning  of 1992.  This  is consistent  with  our  conclusion  that 
the markets  perceived Italy as having more competitiveness  problems 
than other EMS countries. The forward  discount then grew to sizable 
proportions  during  the summer. 
The behavior  of the British  pound  and the Spanish  peseta (as shown 
in figure 14) is strikingly  different. Following the two countries' entry 
into the ERM, their forward rates consistently remained within the 
band.  Even in the days leading  up to the lira  devaluation  (September  14), 
the two currencies'  forward  rates did not drop out of the band. Again, 
this is consistent  with  our  conclusion  that  Britain's  and  Spain's  competi- 
tiveness problems  were less pronounced  than  Italy's. 
Figure 14 also plots forward  rates for four other countries  for which 
there is even less evidence of competitive  difficulties:  Ireland,  France, 
Denmark,  and Sweden. It is striking  that these countries  saw their  for- 
ward  rates  drop  out of the band  after  the Danish  referendum  and before 
September  14. (For comparison,  we also provide  data  on the rock-solid 
Dutch  guilder.) 
48. James  Blitz, "Close  Shave  for Sterling,"  Financial  Times,  August  26, 1992,  p. 26. 
See also Peter Marsh  and James Blitz, "EC  Ministers  Rule Out Realignment  of ERM," 
Financial  Times, August 29-30,  1992, p. 1. 
49. Alice  Rawsthorn,  "French  Doubts  on Maastricht  Grow,"  Financial  Times,  August 
29-30, 1992,  p. 3. 
50. Lionel  Barber  and  William  Dawkins,  "French  No Vote Would  Destabilize  Europe, 
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To a considerable  degree,  the data  support  the explanation  for the cri- 
sis based on deterministic  shifts  in future  policies. In particular,  this ex- 
planation  is supported  by the correlation  between obstacles to ratifying 
the Maastricht  treaty and difficulties  in foreign exchange markets. As 
these obstacles mounted,  the balance  of costs and  benefits  shifted  away 
from policies that would support  the exchange rate in order to qualify 
for EMU and  toward  more  expansionary  policies that  would  respond  to 
rising  unemployment. 
Nonetheless, certain  facts sit uneasily with this interpretation.  Un- 
employment  was rising everywhere, not only in those countries that 
were attacked.  Incumbent  governments  were weak throughout  Europe, 
not just where speculative crises erupted. While some countries that 
were attacked  shifted  their  policies in more  stimulative  directions  subse- 
quently,  others  did  not. All this leads us to believe that  a fourth  and  final 
explanation  is required  based on multiple equilibria  and self-fulfilling 
speculative  attacks. 
Self-Fulfilling  Speculative Attacks 
The idea that  a pegged  exchange  rate can be successfully attacked  in 
the absence of any problem  with fundamentals,  either expected or fu- 
ture, rests on the principle  of self-fulfilling  attacks that arbitrarily  shift 
the foreign  exchange  market  between alternative  equilibria.  That  multi- 
ple equilibria  can exist in foreign  exchange  markets  was pointed  out by 
Flood and Garber51  and Obstfeld.52  An attack can occur even if the 
stance of policy is consistent  with  balance-of-payments  equilibrium  and 
the pegged  exchange  rate  is sustainable  indefinitely.  Yet if investors an- 
ticipate  that  monetary  policy will be modified  as the result  of an attack- 
becoming  looser than  the preattack  policy-then  capital  gains  on foreign 
assets will be rationally  anticipated.  It is this ex post validation  that 
makes  attack  and  no-attack  equilibria  viable simultaneously. 
This model must  be clearly  distinguished  from  that  of Krugmans3  and 
Flood and Garber,s4  described  above. That  model has a unique  equilib- 
51. Flood  and  Garber  (1984b). 
52. Obstfeld  (1986). 
53. Krugman  (1979). 
54. Flood  and  Garber  (1984a). Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  91 
rium:  the exchange  rate is attacked  only if a balance-of-payments  prob- 
lem already exists,  implying the  eventual exhaustion of  reserves. 
Equally, the model of multiple equilibria  we develop in this section 
should  be distinguished  from the model developed in the previous sec- 
tion. There, equilibrium  is unique:  the exchange  rate is attacked  only if 
an anticipated  future balance-of-payments  problem exists, inevitably 
implying  the eventual  exhaustion  of reserves. 
Self-fulfilling  attacks  are different.  In the preceding  models, the mar- 
kets merely  anticipate  the crisis;  in models  of self-fulfilling  attacks,  they 
provoke  it. The policy shift  is contingent;  it occurs  if and  only if an attack 
occurs. In the absence of the attack, no balance-of-payments  problem 
exists and  the current  exchange  rate  can be maintained  indefinitely.  But 
if an attack occurs because market participants  rationally anticipate 
that, if (and only if) attacked, policy will be modified  in a more expan- 
sionary  direction,  then the attack  can succeed, shifting  the economy to 
a different  equilibrium. 
To illustrate  these points, we again  use the single-country  model of 
the preceding  section. But we now assume that central  bank policy re- 
mains  invariant  in the absence of an attack. How events evolve in the 
event of an attack depends on the central  bank's reaction. We explore 
two alternatives,  under  the assumption  of perfect  foresight.  The first  al- 
ternative  is the case of a "wet"  central  bank that, in the event of an at- 
tack, increases the money supply from mO  to M1. The corresponding 
long-run  equilibrium  is at point B in figure 15. Should a speculative at- 
tack unfold, depreciation  would occur immediately as the economy 
jumps from  A to C on the new stable path SIS1. Over time the system 
converges  to B along that stable path.55  The attack  is self-fulfilling.  The 
currency  is weak because of the monetary  authorities'  lack  of credibility 
in reacting  to the attack. 
The second equilibrium  describes the case of a "dry"  central bank 
that  credibly  commits  to react  to an attack  by decreasing  the money sup- 
ply from  mo  to M2.  The corresponding  path  is shown  by the  jump  from  A 
to E followed by convergence  to the long-run  equilibrium  point  D along 
the stable path S2S2. This second equilibrium  will not be observed be- 
55. This  trajectory  resembles  Rudiger  Dornbusch's  overshooting  result.  (Undershoot- 
ing would  occur if the convergence  path slopes upward.)  Here, however, the money in- 
crease  is the perfectly  anticipated  endogenous  response  of the central  bank  to the specula- 
tive attack  and  not, as in Dornbusch  (1976),  an exogenous  change  in the money  supply. 92  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure  15. Long-Run  Equilibria  after a Central  Bank  Reacts  to a Speculative  Attack 
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cause, under  the perfect  foresight  assumption,  a speculative  attack  will 
not occur when the exchange  rate  is expected to appreciate. 
For this model of multiple  equilibria  to be compelling,  there must be 
specific  grounds  for supposing  that  it applied  to the events of September. 
In other words, there must be an intrinsic  reason to have anticipated  a 
shift  in policy if and  only if an attack  occurred.  In  fact, incentives  forjust 
such a shift  were built  into the Maastricht  treaty. 
The  relevant  provisions  of the treaty  are  summarized  in the appendix. 
For current  purposes  what matter  are the so-called "convergence  crite- 
ria" that must be met by countries seeking to qualify for monetary Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  93 
union-particularly the condition  requiring  a country  to maintain  a sta- 
ble exchange  rate  (within  the normal,  narrow  EMS fluctuation  band)  for 
the two preceding  years  without  "severe  tensions."  The downside  of this 
otherwise  judicious rule is that tensions provoked  by the market  may 
disqualify  a country  from European  monetary  union and thereby  intro- 
duce scope for self-fulfilling  attacks.  This in turn  would  remove  the gov- 
ernment's incentive to maintain  the current policies whose principal 
benefits  resulted  from qualifying  the country  for EMU. A rational  gov- 
ernment would shift toward more accommodating  monetary policies 
only if attacked.  But the knowledge  that it had this incentive to change 
policy in the event of an attack  provides  foreign  exchange  traders  with 
the incentive to undertake  it. While  the treaty  can be interpreted  as pre- 
cluding  EMU membership  only by countries  that  actively sought  to de- 
value, as opposed to those that  did so involuntarily,  it seems unlikely  in 
practice  that countries  that experienced  fatal crises forcing  them to re- 
align  would be regarded  favorably  by the European  Monetary  Institute 
(EMI) and the European  Commission  when it came time for them to 
evaluate  conformance  with the convergence  criteria.56 
"Severe  tensions"  in 1992  would  be more  likely to lead a government 
to conclude  that  its prospects  for participating  in EMU had  been signifi- 
cantly damaged  if two additional  conditions  were met: first, that EMU 
is likely to begin  relatively  early, giving  devaluing  countries  little time  to 
repair their reputations;  and second, that countries missing the boat 
when it leaves the dock will find  it difficult  to board  later. The timing  of 
Stage  III, the formal  start  of EMU, is uncertain.  The European  Commis- 
sion and the European  Monetary  Institute  must indicate  to the Council 
no later  than  the end of 1996  which countries  meet the convergence  cri- 
teria. If only a minority  of EC countries  do so, Stage II may continue 
until  January  1, 1999,  the last possible  date  for  the inauguration  of EMU. 
Again, the Commission  and the EMI must report  in 1998  as to which 
countries  satisfy the conditions  and thus can form the initial  nucleus of 
the monetary  union. Other  countries  may be admitted  once it is deter- 
mined  that  they satisfy the conditions. 
But if a majority  of EC countries  meet the convergence  criteria,  Stage 
III may start  earlier.  Most commentators  have interpreted  the provision 
56. We return  to this point  in the eleventh  section. Also see the appendix. 94  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
that the European  Monetary  Institute  and the Commission  must report 
no later than the end of 1996  as implying  that Stage III will not com- 
mence before that  point (that  is, the beginning  of 1997).  In fact, nothing 
in the treaty  prevents  the EMI and the Commission  from  reporting  ear- 
lier  in Stage II if they believe that  a majority  of countries  satisfy  the con- 
vergence criteria.  In theory, they could report  on January  2, 1994, the 
second day  of Stage  II, using  the performance  of countries  during  Stage  I 
as their  basis  for concluding  that  the convergence  criteria  were satisfied. 
Theoretically,  nothing  prevents  Stage  III  from  beginning  as early  as next 
year.57 
Moreover,  an implication  of the convergence  criteria  is that the con- 
ditions  applied  to the first  group  of participants  may  be looser than  those 
applied  later.  This argument  is spelled  out by Alberto  Alesina  and  Vitto- 
rio Grilli.58  They show that  once a subset of EMS countries  that share  a 
preference  for relatively  low inflation  forms  a monetary  union,  they may 
resist enlarging  it to include  other countries  preferring  higher  inflation, 
because this may push up the union's common inflation  rate, making 
things  worse for the initial  members.  This can be true even when every 
country would be better off with a Community-wide  monetary  union 
than  with no monetary  union  at all.59 
In summary,  this section's model  shows that  self-fulfilling  attacks  can 
occur in theory. The events of the summer  of 1992  confirm  that  they can 
occur in practice. In particular,  the Maastricht  treaty's provisions re- 
garding  membership  and starting  date for EMU created scope for self- 
fulfilling  attacks. Whether  certain  EMS countries  also had competitive- 
ness problems  will continue  to be debated. Our  point here is that there 
were good reasons  to anticipate  a speculative  crisis even in the absence 
of such problems. 
57. The dominant  view in 1992  was that  the earliest  date of real  importance  was Janu- 
ary 1, 1997.  The procedure  for early start-up  was seen as a diplomatic  gesture toward 
France,  with  little  chance  of activation.  If this  view is correct,  it tends  to weaken  the expla- 
nation  of self-fulfilling  attacks,  but  can  be used to winnow  scenarios  for  the  future  of EMU 
that  we discuss in our  concluding  sections. 
58. Alesina  and  Grilli  (1993). 
59. Alesina's  and  Grilli's  model  is based  on strong  assumptions,  notably  that  the com- 
mon  inflation  rate  of the EMU  will  be chosen  by the median  voter, with  one vote per  coun- 
try. It nonetheless  makes  a useful  point  that  the early  entrants  may  reap  most  of the bene- 
fits of EMU without  admitting  the laggards,  and that, insofar  as the latter  have different 
characteristics,  the former  may  erect  barriers  to subsequent  accession. Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  95 
Table  3. Reasons  for the Crisis 
Percent 
Vety  Not 
Question  and response  important  Important  important 
What  in your opinion  was the most important  factor 
in making  changes in ERM currencies  likely? 
Lack of public support  for the Maastricht  treaty  33.1  44.4  15.0 
Persistent  inflation  in: 
Italy  27.8  39.1  22.6 
Spain  21.8  37.6  28.6 
UK  15.0  40.6  32.3 
Germany  38.3  35.3  18.0 
High German  interest  rates  68.4  21.1  6.0 
Realignment  was overdue  anyway  39.8  27.1  24.1 
Instability  of Swedish and Finnish  currencies  10.5  33.8  42.9 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on their February 1993 survey of European foreign-exchange  traders. 
A Survey  of Foreign  Exchange  Markets 
Given the four interpretations we have presented to explain the Sep- 
tember crisis-overt  or hidden competitiveness  problems,  anticipated 
policy  shifts,  and speculative  attacks unrelated to competitiveness-it 
seems natural to ask market participants which ones informed their ac- 
tions. In the second half of February 1993, we therefore mailed a ques- 
tionnaire to all European traders listed in the Currency and Instrument 
Directory.60  Although some dealers are not listed in this directory, it rep- 
resents  nearly the entire population  of foreign  exchange  traders.  We 
sent out 560 questionnaires  and received  132 responses,  a respectable 
response  rate for a mail survey.  The results  are tabulated in tables  3 
through 7. 
The survey responses  provide  some  support for all four interpreta- 
tions. However,  we would argue, the balance of sentiment supports an- 
ticipated future policy shifts and self-fulfilling attacks. In table 3 we tab- 
ulate  answers  to  the  question,  "What in your  opinion  was  the  most 
important factor in making changes in ERM currencies likely?" Many 
respondents  checked  more  than  one  alternative.  Yet  inflation-the 
60. Citibank  (1990).  We sent questionnaires  only to the heads of trading  rooms or to 
senior traders,  not to each individual  in the same financial  institution.  Nonetheless, in 
more  than  half  the cases, we sent  two or more  questionnaires  to a particular  financial  insti- 
tution. 96  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table  4. Why  Did Central  Banks  Give Up? 
Percent 
Very  Not 
Question  and response  important  Important  important 
In September,  central banks  ultimately  gave up 
defending  certain  European  currencies. 
What  explains  this decision? 
Central  banks'  reserves are always insufficient  23.3  40.6  30.8 
Central  banks'  reserves are insufficient  now 
that most exchange  controls  in Europe  have 
been removed  28.6  38.3  28.6 
Central  banks  worried  that further  interest  rate 
increases would destabilize  banking  systems  21.8  47.4  24.1 
The Bundesbank  worried  that further 
intervention  would threaten  price stability  22.6  45.1  26.3 
Central  banks  worried  that further  interest  rate 
increases would worsen domestic  economic 
conditions  64.7  23.3  3.8 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on their  February  1993  survey  of European  foreign-exchange  traders. 
source  of speculative  attacks  in models emphasizing  current  fundamen- 
tals-is  not one of the most popular  answers. 
An exception to this generalization  is the view of German  inflation. 
The response that German  inflation  made a realignment  likely must be 
interpreted  differently  than concern about inflation  in other countries 
because the DM, rather  than one of the currencies  attacked, was the 
strong  currency  against  which the others were devalued. Emphasis  on 
German  inflation  is properly  interpreted  as an indication  that  traders  an- 
ticipated  high interest rates and tight money, which would exacerbate 
unemployment  in other  EMS countries.  This  interpretation  is supported 
by the emphasis  respondents  placed  on the high  level of German  interest 
rates, which heightened deflationary  pressure and unemployment  in 
other  countries,  again  increasing  the likelihood  of a future  policy shift. 
Only 22 percent of the respondents  claim to have been expecting a 
realignment  before the Danish referendum.61 This confirms  our point 
that the timing  of the 1992  attacks does not fit well with interpretations 
61. Some respondents  may have exaggerated  their  foresight.  This bias supports  our 
argument  by suggesting  that  even less than  the 22 percent  of respondents  who claimed  to 
have  anticipated  a realignment  before  the Danish  referendum  really  did  so. Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  97 
Table  5. Expectation  of Imminent  Changes  in ERM  Parities 
Percent 
Question  and response 
When  did you first begin to think  that changes in ERM 
exchange rates were imminent? 
Before the Danish  referendum  in June  21.8 
Just after the Danish  referendum  46.6 
Upon hearing about public opinion polls in France 
during  the run-up  to the referendum  15.1 
Around  the time of the Finnish  crisis and devaluation  6.8 
Around  the time of the Swedish crisis in September  6.8 
Other  9.1 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on their  February  1993  survey  of European  foreign-exchange  traders. 
emphasizing current fundamentals. The  importance respondents 
attached  to the two referenda  supports  our third  interpretation,  which 
emphasizes  rising  unemployment  and  future  policy shifts. 
Once the initial attacks occurred, the relative importance  traders 
attached  to different  factors could have changed. Fundamentals  could 
have become increasingly  important  in countries such as Ireland  that 
traded  heavily  with  the first  EMS countries  forced  to devalue.62  Alterna- 
tively, lack of confidence  in EMS currencies  could have spread  conta- 
giously. Responses that "the markets  had 'tasted blood' (realized  that 
there were profits  to be made)"  are consistent with this view. Tables 6 
and  7 suggest  that  factors  other  than  fundamentals  outweighed  consider- 
ations of trade  and competitiveness.  Not surprisingly,  competitiveness 
played  a larger  role in spillovers  within  the EMS than  in spillovers  from 
the Nordic countries  to the EC. 
We think  that  this survey sheds considerable  light  on what happened 
during  the September  crisis. The emphasis  respondents  placed on infla- 
tion suggests that  fundamentals  played some role; it is no coincidence, 
in other  words, that the Italian  lira  was first  to be attacked,  followed by 
sterling  and the peseta. But fundamentals  do not explain the timing  or 
course  of the attacks. Whether  the markets  forced a change  in policy or 
simply  anticipated  it remains  an open question. One fact points in the 
direction  of the former explanation:  in enumerating  what factors they 
62. Forty  percent  of Ireland's  exports  went to EMS  countries  that  had  been forced  to 
realign  by the end of 1992.  These and the following  figures  on 1991  trade  shares  are from 
the IMF's  Direction of Trade Statistics (1992). 98  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table  6. Devaluation  Contagion  within  the ERM 
Percent 
Question  and response 
Did the weakness  of some ERM currencies  late in the summer  lead you 
to anticipate  weakness  of other ERM currencies? 
The 90.2 percent  responding  yes gave these reasons: 
Devaluing  countries  are able to undercut  competitors  53.4 
Markets  "tasted  blood"  (realized  that  there  were profits  to be made)  76.7 
Other  4.5 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on their  February  1993  survey  of European  foreign-exchange  traders. 
consider when assessing  the prospects for a particular currency, dealers 
gave a low ranking to unemployment,  suggesting that they attached rela- 
tively little weight to the possibility that a deteriorating employment sit- 
uation would inevitably force  a government  to abandon its defense  of 
the currency. 
Life without  Capital  Controls 
The removal of capital controls has changed the European monetary 
environment in two significant ways.  First, the absence of controls ren- 
ders official foreign  exchange  reserves  redundant-or  nearly  so.  Re- 
serves are dwarfed by the resources that markets can bring to bear. This 
in turn implies  the need for very  high interest  rates to defend  an ex- 
change rate when the markets attack it. Second,  these high interest rates 
can seriously  and negatively  affect economic  activity,  the government 
budget, the housing market, and the stability of the financial system  if 
they are maintained for extended  periods.  And in a foreign exchange 
market with multiple equilibria, they may have to be maintained at high 
levels indefinitely. 
Market Pressures 
Daily  turnover on foreign  exchange  markets  exceeds  $1 trillion- 
more than the total official foreign reserves of all IMF member countries 
combined-according  to  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements.63 
63. See "Realignment  Merchants,"  Economist,  September  26, 1992,  p. 90. Bariy Eichenggreen  and Charles Wyplosz  99 
Table  7. Devaluation  Contagion  from Outside  the ERM 
Percent 
Question  and response 
Did the weakness  of non-ERM  countries  (those of 
Finland, Sweden, and Norway,  for example)  lead you to 
anticipate weakness  of ERM currencies? 
The 50.4 percent  responding  yes gave these reasons: 
Devaluing  countries  are able to undercut  competitors  23.3 
Markets  have "tasted  blood"  (realize  that there are 
profits  to be made)  42.9 
Other  3.8 
The 49.6 percent  responding  no gave these reasons: 
ERM central  banks  can borrow  from one another  22.6 
EC countries  mostly trade  with one another  24.8 
EC countries'  financial  markets  are deeper  36.1 
Other  1.5 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on their  February  1993  survey  of European  foreign-exchange  traders. 
These numbers  dwarf  the otherwise-impressive  quantities  of interven- 
tion in which the EC countries  engaged  during  the crisis: $46 billion in 
July  and  August, and $228  billion  in September  and October.64 
Relative  to reserves, then, the supply  of speculative  capital  is in effect 
perfectly  elastic. Under  these circumstances,  only very high short-term 
interest  rates may  prevent  the exhaustion  of foreign  exchange  reserves. 
Table 8 illustrates  this point for various devaluation  expectations. To 
offset a 10  percent  devaluation  with a 90 percent  likelihood  of occurring 
in ten days, risk-neutral  investors will require  annualized  interest  rates 
of 762  percent.65  In this light, it is not surprising  that  Sweden was forced 
to raise  its overnight  rate  to an annualized  rate  of 500  percent  at the peak 
of its crisis. 
Are countries  at the mercy of the markets,  or can capital  controls  in- 
crease their  room  for maneuver?  As table  4 reports,  survey  respondents 
attached surprisingly  little importance  to the presence or absence of 
controls:  nearly  half the respondents  listed as unimportant  the fact that 
reserves are insufficient  now that controls have been removed. Yet 
64. Alogoskoufis  (1993).  The figures  refer  to estimates  of gross  intervention. 
65. These rates are calculated  with the simplifying  assumption  that  foreign  assets do 
not bear  interest.  Because  interest  rates  on DM bank  deposits  were on the order  of 7 per- 
cent, this  approximation  changes  the results  very little. 100  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table  8. Interest  Rate Required  to Render  Investors  Indifferent  between  Holding 
Domestic  and Foreign  Assets 
Percent  per year 
Event 
5 percent  10 percent 
Probability  devaluation  in  devaluation  in 
of event  10 days  10 days 
50 percent  85  238 
70 percent  136  442 
90 percent  201  762 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
there is at least circumstantial  evidence that capital  controls  play a sig- 
nificant  role. Of the countries  subjected  to the fiercest attacks, none of 
those that  were forced to leave the ERM  maintained  capital  controls. In 
contrast, all of those countries that managed to realign and remain 
within  the ERM still had controls  in place. Moreover,  Ireland  removed 
its controls  on January  1, 1993,  and was forced to realign  shortly  there- 
after. 
Further  evidence is provided  by deviations  from  covered  interest  par- 
ity, a standard  measure  of the magnitude  of controls.  In figure  16, specu- 
lative attacks are easily identifiable  in France and Italy before January 
1990 and July 1990, respectively, when controls were lifted; the data 
confirm  that  countries  that  maintained  controls  enjoyed  very substantial 
insulation  between onshore and offshore interest rates on comparable 
assets.66  Ireland,  one of the few EMS countries  to retain  significant  capi- 
tal controls  in 1992,  provides  a recent  example.  At the time of the crisis, 
Irish controls allowed domestic interest rates to be nearly 80 (annu- 
alized)  percentage  points  lower than  they would  have been without  con- 
trols, measured  by the deviation  from covered interest  parity  shown in 
figure  17. 
In response to our argument  that controls play an important  role in 
supporting  pegged exchange rates, it might  be argued  that France and 
Denmark,  which did  not have controls, were also attacked  but were not 
66. Note that  covered  interest  differentials  can remain  even in the absence  of controls 
because  of transactions  costs, information  costs, differential  default  risk  on assets denomi- 
nated  in different  currencies,  and  expectations  that  capital  controls  may  be reimposed  be- 
fore the interest-bearing  assets mature,  as Frankel  and MacArthur  (1988)  have argued. 
However, their  magnitude  should  be relatively  small. Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  101 
Figure  16. Spread  between  Offshore  and Onshore  Interbank  Rates  for France  and Italy 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using DRI bid rates. 
a. The figure  shows the difference  between  interest  rates  for one-month  maturities  in London,  where  interest  rate 
parity  holds, and in Paris  and Milan,  respectively,  where  controls  are applied. 
forced to devalue. It is not as difficult  as it might  seem to reconcile this 
objection  with  our  conclusion  because  there  is an  alternative  to controls: 
unlimited  intervention  by other countries. Both Denmark  and France 
were recipients of  massive (effectively unlimited) support by  the 
Bundesbank,  as we analyze below. 
Costs of Defense 
Sufficiently  high  interest  rates should  be capable  of rebuffing  even the 
most concerted speculative  attack. If so, then understanding  the crisis 102  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 17.  Deviations from Covered Interest Rate Parity for the Irish Punt 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using DRI data on one-month  maturities. 
requires  an explanation  of why some governments  refused  to hold inter- 
est rates at high  levels. Market  participants  clearly  recognized  that high 
interest  rates were painful,  as responses to our survey showed in table 
4. The question  is through  what channels  this pain  was experienced. 
In this section, we consider  four areas that high interest  rates might 
affect: economic activity, the housing  market,  the banking  system, and 
the budget. In all four cases, even stratospheric  interest rates-like 
Sweden's 500 percent  overnight  rates-have  relatively  small effects as 
long as they are maintained  for short  periods. Only when high  rates are 
maintained  for extended  periods  does the pain  prove intolerable. 
Critically,  however, when the potential  source of instability  is multi- 
ple equilibria  in the foreign exchange market, it may be necessary to 
maintain  high  rates  for extended  periods.  This is what  governments  con- 
cluded  was intolerable  in the final  months  of 1992. 
IMPACT  ON ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY.  Criticismofhighinterestrateson 
the grounds  that they depressed economic activity was rampant  in the 
fall  of 1992.67  Of  course, this is the standard  reason  that  governments  are 
thought  to dislike  high  rates. 
Starting  in 1990,  the upward  pressure  on short-term  interest  rates  was 
67. For example,  for commentary  on Ireland,  see "Down  the Fast Track  tc a Pot of 
Gold,"  Financial  Times,  October  14, 1992,  p. 2. Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  103 
considerable. But in terms of the determinants  of investment activity 
and  other  macroeconomic  aggregates,  long-term  interest  rates are  likely 
to matter  more. The upward  movement  of long-term  nominal  rates was 
minimal,  as shown in figure  9. Because there was little reason  to expect 
a change  in inflationary  expectations  over long horizons, the figure  pro- 
vides a reasonable  picture  of the evolution  of long-term  real  rates. Thus 
insofar as changes in interest rates exercise their real effects through 
standard  macroeconomic  channels, it would appear  that their effect on 
the European  economy remained  minimal. Only if the rise in interest 
rates  was expected to be long-lived  and  thereby  to affect the entire  term 
structure  would one expect to see activity dramatically  affected. 
IMPACT  ON  MORTGAGE  INTEREST  RATES.  In the United Kingdom 
and Ireland,  mortgage  interest  payments  are indexed to money market 
rates.68  Hence higher  money market  rates can impose a significant  cost 
on homeowners. Assume a mortgage  rate of 10 percent. If the money 
market  rate  increases  to 20 percent  for two weeks, then  the annual  mort- 
gage rate (computed  as a geometric average of monthly rates and ad- 
justed yearly) increases to 10.4 percent. If the overnight  rate increases 
to 100  percent  for two weeks, the annual  mortgage  rate  rises to 12.8  per- 
cent. These are significant  but not intolerable  costs. 
If, however, defense of the currency requires high money market 
rates to be maintained  for longer  periods, the impact  on mortgage  rates 
can be dramatic.  Even a relatively "modest"  money market  rate of 20 
percent  maintained  for three months  raises the annual  mortgage  rate to 
12.4  percent, while a 100  percent  interest  rate lifts it to a punishing  27.7 
percent. Higher  mortgage  rates can in turn  have a predictable  negative 
effect on the housing  market.  Unless the authorities  believe that  high  in- 
terest rates will succeed in quickly repelling  a speculative  attack, they 
may hesitate to pursue this option because of the screams of home- 
owners. 69 
68. Arrangements  are similar  in Sweden. When  the Swedish central  bank  raised  its 
marginal  lending  rate  from 16 to 75 percent  in the second week of September,  the banks 
announced  that  they were raising  home  loan rates by 5 percentage  points  to 22.5 percent 
and  short-term  property  loans by 3.5 points  to 21 percent.  But because  approximately  85 
percent  of the loans are not indexed,  the blow was quite  limited. 
69. In the United  Kingdom,  mortgage  lenders  welcomed  sterling's  departure  from  the 
ERM  on the grounds  that  it heralded  lower interest  rates;  they therefore  begged  the gov- 
ernment  not  to reenter  the mechanism.  See David  Owen  and  Chris  Tighe,  "Tory  MPs  Fight 
Shy of the ERM,"  Financial  Times,  September  18, 1992,  p. 5. 104  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
IMPACT  ON  THE  BUDGET.  Equally  important  for some countries  is a 
third  channel  through  which high  interest  rates affect the economy: the 
government  budget.  Interest  rate  increases  can have a significant  impact 
on the budgetary  position in countries  with high  debt-to-GDP  ratios. In 
Italy, for example, where the debt-to-income  ratio  exceeds 100  percent 
and significant  amounts  of debt are short term, every percentage  point 
increase  in the Banca d'Italia's  discount rate adds 13 trillion  lire to the 
budget  deficit.70 
In addition, there is the danger  that higher  interest rates will trans- 
form  the exchange  rate  crisis into a debt crisis. The average  maturity  of 
the Italian  public  debt is three years. Gross debt issues amount  to more 
than  half  of GDP each year.71  Any hint  that  the budget  deficit  is about  to 
widen significantly  because of increased  debt-service  costs could alarm 
bondholders  and make  the next round  of financing  perilous.72 
But  again,  the duration  of the interest  rate  increases  is critical.  If rates 
rise only temporarily,  the increased debt-service burden is relatively 
modest. Indeed, assuming  a manageable  debt-service  burden,  a tempo- 
rary  increase  in rates  can make  absorbing  new issues more  attractive  be- 
cause of their  temporarily  high  yield. 
IMPACT  ON  THE  BANKS.  A final  channel  through  which high  interest 
rates can adversely affect the economy is by destabilizing  the banking 
system. High central bank lending rates increase the cost of credit to 
commercial  banks. This undermines  bank  profitability  and capital  ade- 
quacy, in the worst case requiring  the government  to bail  out the banks. 
Bailouts  shift  the cost of stabilizing  the banking  system onto the govern- 
ment  balance  sheet, with negative  implications  for inflation,  the current 
account, and ultimately  exchange rate stability. When asked why cen- 
tral  banks  gave up defending  certain  currencies,  about  two-thirds  of sur- 
vey respondents  ranked  as important  or very important  worries  that  fur- 
70. See James  Blitz, "Italian  Lira:  The Sick Currency  of Europe,"  Financial Times, 
July  22, 1992,  p. 2. See also estimates  that  every point  of short-term  interest  rates  (as op- 
posed  to the  discount  rate)  adds 15  trillion  lire.  (Edward  Balls, "The  Delicate  Art  of Persua- 
sion,"  Financial  Times  August  4, 1992,  p. 14.)  These estimates  assume  that  the higher  in- 
terest rate is maintained  for at least two years; Pierluigi  Ciocca of the Banca d'Italia 
confirmed  this in private  communication. 
71.  La Lettre du C.E.P.I.I.  (January 1993, p. 1). 
72. For models  of debt  runs,  see Alesina,  Prati,  and  Tabellini  (1990)  and  Giavazzi  and 
Pagano  (1990). Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz  105 
Figure  18. Changes  in Ratings  of Banks  in Europe,  1991-93a 
Percent 
0  .0...  .......... 
........  ~  .g.;  .00  ;ii:i-00Ei  .  ....:  .:E  ..;  :iV  'g'  .:'  .  ...  W  .i.--;  .-:  ..  ...  ...-0  :.-  ...  ;.i.  :.:....  .  -..  ...  ..  -  .i.iE-E  !E:EiS-!;  i  E  !g-  - igR-g  . E :E!.-;C  -:E  i-iE  :! 
-4.0___  !,-!0:0: 
-5 .0  I  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  l  I 
July  January  July  January 
1991  1992  1992  1993 
Source: International  Bank  Corporate  Analysis, 1993. 
a. Difference  between  the number  of banks  with  rankings  that  are upgraded  and those that  are downgraded,  as a 
percentage  of all rated  banks.  Countries  included  are Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy, 
the Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  and  the United  Kingdom.  No bar  signifies  that  there  were no changes  in 
bank  ratings  for that  particular  month. 
ther interest rate increases would destabilize banking  systems; this is 
shown in table  4. 
Evidence of the difficulties  of European  banks is provided  in figure 
18. It reports  the difference  between the number  of banks  whose finan- 
cial status is upgraded  and downgraded  by International  Bank Corpo- 
rate Analysis, a rating  agency based in London. The deteriorating  fi- 
nancial condition of European banks is evident in the fact that the 
numbers  are consistently  negative. The difference  in numbers  of down- 
gradings  and  upgradings  peaks in September  1991;  in May 1992,  immedi- 
ately before the first  phase of the crisis; in the subsequent  September, 
following  the rise in discount  rates; and again  in the following  Novem- 
ber. This suggests a correlation  between the interest  rate policies pur- 
sued to defend  EMS parities  and the difficulties  of the banks. 
Again, however, that impact  is likely to be powerful  only if rates are 
held at high  levels for extended  periods. Furthermore,  both commercial 
and  central  banks  found  ways to soften  the effects. In Sweden,  for exam- 
ple, where overnight  rates were raised to an annualized  rate of 75 and 
then 500  percent, the Riksbank  employed  a graduated  ladder  of interest 
rates. Each bank  has its own interest  rate scale, which is set according 
to its capital.  In September  only SwedishKr  1.6  billion  of the SwedishKr 106  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
46.6 billion of bank borrowings  from the central  bank bore the highest 
("marginal")  interest rate. The average overnight  lending rate was 23 
percent  for banks borrowing  from the central  bank when the marginal 
rate was 75 percent, and 50 percent when the marginal  rate was 500 
percent.73 
In France  as in Sweden, resident  commercial  banks  were spared  the 
full blow of the increase in short-term  rates to more than 20 percent. 
They enjoy privileged  access to the Bank of France's biweekly allot- 
ments, on which the rate  was not raised. This-along  with strong  moral 
suasion by the authorities-explains the differential  between the Lon- 
don  and  Paris  rates  on the franc.  (The  London  rate  soared  relative  to that 
prevailing  in Paris;  a differential  of nearly  five percentage  points  opened 
up at the height  of the crisis.)74 
Another  way high interest  rates may destabilize  the banking  system 
is through  their  impact  on the property  market.  If high  interest  rates are 
maintained  for an extended  period,  the consequences can include  weak 
demand  for loans, an increase  in the number  of foreclosures, and a fur- 
ther  decline in property  prices-all  of which would be bad news for the 
banks. Again, none of these effects is likely to operate  powerfully  if the 
increase  in interest  rates is short-lived. 
Implication 
Our  analysis of the four channels through  which high interest rates 
affected  the economy points  to the same  conclusion;  stratospheric  rates 
are tolerable  for short periods, but become impossible  to bear if main- 
tained  for long. If European  central  banks stopped defending  their ex- 
73. See Sara  Webb,  "Sweden  Awaits Return  of the 'Hot Money,"' Financial Times, 
September  11, 1992,  p. 2, and  the Riksbank.  For an excellent  analysis  of the Swedish  cri- 
sis, see Horngren  and  Lindberg  (1993).  The  Riksbank  also provided  its banks  and  financial 
institutions  with a large  number  of special  facilities  at much  lower rates (Sveriges  Riks- 
bank,  Annual  Report 1992:4,  p. 20). 
74. Still, there  is no doubt  that  banks  suffered.  The Association  of French  Banks  as- 
serts that holding  the prime  rate to 10 percent  when overnight  money and even three- 
month  interest  rates  commanded  12  percent  was costing  the bankers  Ffr  300 million  ($54 
million)  a month,  a substantial  sum compared  to the value of the commercial  banks'  de- 
mand  and  time  deposits  (about  Ffr3.9  billion).  It has been suggested  that  the banks,  rather 
than  incurring  the wrath  of the government  by raising  lending  rates, refused  to lend  at all. 
See William  Dawkins,  "French  Banks  Seeking  Base Rate  Rise,"  Financial  Times,  October 
3, 1992,  p. 2. Barry  Eichengreen  and Charles  Wyplosz  107 
change  rates, they must have grown convinced that their high interest 
rates  would  prove impossible  to reduce  quickly. 
The Swedish case supports  this conjecture.  Toward  the beginning  of 
the crisis, the Riksbank  raised its marginal  rate to 500 percent. But the 
reserves  that  had  been lost during  the crisis did not flow back in as soon 
as the crisis passed, even after  turbulence  in other markets  died down. 
When  capital  again  flowed  out in November  (the  total  outflow  during  one 
week reached  SwedishKr 158  billion, in comparison  with an outflow  of 
SwedishKr  60 billion in September),  it would have been necessary to 
ratchet  interest  rates back up, without  any assurance  that it would stop 
the hemorrhage  of reserves that had continued after the first rate in- 
crease.75  At this point  the Riksbank  stopped  defending  the krona. - 
That  a short  period  of high  interest  rates would not permanently  cur- 
tail adverse speculation  is an implication  of the existence of multiple 
equilibria.  High rates could defer the speculative  attack  so long as they 
are maintained,  as we explained in the discussion surrounding  table 8 
above. But as soon as rates are lowered, the markets  have the same in- 
centive as before  to attack.  Once  they do, the exchange  rate  depreciates 
as the government  shifts to a more accommodating  policy. In the pres- 
ence of multiple  equilibria,  interest rates therefore have to be main- 
tained  indefinitely  at high  levels to stabilize  the exchange  rate.76  This is 
what  central  banks  were unwilling  to tolerate  in 1992. 
The Political Economy of the Crisis 
Stratospheric  interest rates could be used to defend exchange rate 
pegs at best to a limited  extent. The only means available  to defend the 
pegs was therefore  unlimited  foreign  support. 
Did Countries Expect  Unlimited Support? 
Foreign  support,  after  all, was supposed  to be what  distinguished  the 
EMS from other fixed exchange rate arrangements.  It featured  a very 
75. Sveriges  Riksbank  (1993). 
76. Insofar  as reserves  have  fallen  in  the course  of previous  crises, it may  be necessary 
to ratchet  domestic  rates  up to even higher  levels. 108  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
short-term  financing  facility (VSTF) (first  established  in 1972  as part  of 
the snake, the failed  attempt  to stabilize  intra-European  exchange  rates 
that  had  preceded  the EMS). The VSTF exists because of the obligation 
to intervene  when a currency  reaches the edge of its fluctuation  band.77 
When a bilateral  exchange rate reaches the maximum  permissible  dis- 
tance from its declared  central  parity  (2.25 percent in the normal  EMS 
band, and 6 percent in the case of the wider band  temporarily  given to 
some new entrants  to the system), both central  banks  concerned  are re- 
quired  to intervene.  While  the strong-currency  country  might  in princi- 
ple purchase  third  currencies  in exchange for its own currency, it was 
agreed  when the EMS was established  that  interventions  should  be con- 
ducted  in the currencies  concerned.  According  to the EMS  Act of Foun- 
dation, "interventions  shall in principle  be effected in currencies  of the 
participating  central  banks.  These interventions  shall  be unlimited  at the 
compulsory  intervention  rates."78 
Moreover, the EMS agreement  gave countries  reason to expect un- 
limited support  when their currencies  fell to the bottom of the band. 
Again,  the Act of Foundation  is unambiguous:  "To  enable  interventions 
to be made in Community  currencies, the participating  central banks 
shall open for each other very short-term  credit facilities, unlimited  in 
amount."79 
The VSTF worked to the satisfaction of all concerned until 1992. 
Many  of the eleven realignments  that  took place between 1979  and 1987 
occurred  in the midst  of incipient  crises that  were contained  temporarily 
by large-scale  intervention  organized  under  the provisions  of the VSTF 
until  an orderly  realignment  could be arranged.80 
77. Amounts  lent  under  the provisions  of the VSTF  must  be repaid  with  interest  within 
seventy-five  days of the end of the month  in which the intervention  took place, but the 
loan can be renewed  automatically  for three  months,  and conditionally  for another  three 
months.  More  details  on the mechanics  of these operations  are provided  by Giavazzi  and 
Giovannini  (1989,  pp. 38-39). Prior  to the Basle-Nyborg  Agreement  of 1987,  the repay- 
ment  period  was forty-five  days. Central  banks  can also use the VSTF for intramarginal 
intervention,  but  in this case, access is not automatic. 
78. The act is formally  known  as the European  Council  Brussels  Resolution,  Article 
3.7, and  was passed  on December  5, 1978.  This passage  appears  in Article  2.2, Section  I, 
Document  8. See Commission  of the European  Communities  (1984,  p. 130). 
79. European  Council  Brussels  Resolution,  Article  6. 1, Section II, Document  8. See 
Commission  of the European  Communities  (1984,  p. 130). 
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Why Countries Should Have  Known Better 
With hindsight, it is obvious that no central bank would ever commit 
unconditionally to unlimited lending.8' The question is how a presump- 
tion to the contrary could have come about. Otmar Emminger, the Bun- 
desbank governor who signed the EMS Act,  had obtained beforehand 
from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany a clause per- 
mitting the  Bundesbank  to  opt  out  from  these  responsibilities.  Em- 
minger apparently saw nothing peculiar about this arrangement, as he 
recalls in his memoirs. 
Of particular  importance  for us were the agreements  between the Government 
and the Bundesbank,  especially concerning  the underpinning  of the Bundes- 
bank's  autonomy  with regard  to monetary  policy. These agreements  have been 
summarized  in a letter  written  by me and  addressed  to the Federal  Government 
in November 1978.  Its essence was as follows: 
'The  autonomy  of the Bundesbank  in monetary  policy would  particularly  be put 
in  jeopardy  if strong  imbalances  with the future  EMS resulted  in extreme  inter- 
vention obligations  which would then threaten  the value of the currency.  This 
would make  it impossible  for the Bundesbank  to carry  out its legal obligations. 
Referring  to repeated  assurances  from  the Chancellor  and  the Finance  Minister, 
the Bundesbank  is starting  from  the premise  that,  if need  be, the German  govern- 
ment  will safeguard  the Bundesbank  from such a situation  of constraint,  either 
by a correction  of the exchange  rate  in the EMS or, if necessary,  by discharging 
the Bundesbank  from  its intervention  obligations.' 
The decisive factor  regarding  the policy of stability  was without  a doubt  the in- 
tention to keep the Bundesbank's  intervention  obligations to an acceptable 
minimum.82 
The government  acquiesced.  Economics  Minister Otto von Lambs- 
dorff went to the Bundestag on December 6, 1978, and stated, "The ad- 
justment of the exchange rate has always been the responsibility of the 
Government and not of the Bundesbank.  The Bundesbank has the re- 
sponsibility to intervene,  and the option not to intervene if it is its opin- 
ion that it is not able to do so. 
83 
For  many  years  this  distinction  was  incompletely  appreciated. 
Through the early years of the EMS, capital controls and realignments 
81. The  analogy  with  the  domestic  lender-of-last-resort  function  suggests  that  a central 
bank  will  demand  the right  to choose whether  to bail  out an insolvent  or  illiquid  institution, 
and  will insist  on oversight  privileges  in returni. 
82. Emminger  (1986,  pp. 361-62). 
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obviated  the need for unlimited intervention.  Things were different in 
1992,  when  neither  capital  controls  nor  the  realignment  option  re- 
mained. What happened once the crisis started building in June neces- 
sarily remains a matter of speculation  (no pun intended).  There is no 
question that the Bundesbank initially responded by intervening in sup- 
port of the lira, acquiring some  $4 billion of foreign exchange.  It then 
grew worried over its ever-growing reserves (some DM 92 billion in Sep- 
tember 1992 alone).  By early September,  its target monetary aggregate 
M3 was rising at an annual rate of nearly 10 percent (far above the target 
range of 3.5 to 5.5 percent). 
The Bundesbank's  Objectives 
Accurately  characterizing the Bundesbank's  objectives  is crucial to 
understanding the political economy of the crisis. Those objectives have 
always been clearly and consistently  stated. As early as 1990, it was the 
Bundesbank's view that: 
To the extent that the stability of exchange rates or even the pronounced 
strength  of a number  of partner  currencies  that  do not belong  to the "hard  core" 
of the EMS can be explained  essentially  by inflation-induced  higher  rates of in- 
terest, it can basically  be justified  only if it is consolidated  by a domestic eco- 
nomic  policy that  is durably  geared  to stability.  If success is not achieved  in cop- 
ing with the structural  causes of inflation  within  a reasonable  period  of time, it 
will probably  become increasingly  difficult  over the long term to avoid having 
recourse  to exchange  rate  adjustments.84 
German economic  and monetary unification brought these  conflicts 
to a head. The Bundesbank dutifully asked for a DM appreciation. When 
rebuffed, it correctly warned that exchange  rate adjustments were un- 
avoidable. As pressure built in the summer of 1992, it responded initially 
by fulfilling its  intervention  obligations.  But doing  so  heightened  the 
conflict between  two of its priorities: safeguarding the EMS and main- 
taining price stability. On Friday, September  11, after a day of massive 
and unprecedented  Bundesbank purchases  of lira, Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl traveled to Frankfurt to meet with Bundesbank officials and dis- 
cuss the dilemma. Given the 1978 agreement with the Federal Govern- 
ment, it is plausible that the Bundesbank, meeting the Chancellor in the 
84. Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1991,  p. 66).  We  thank  Otmar  Issingforbringing  this  quota- 
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midst  of a concerted  attack,  invoked  its right  to limit  its intervention  on 
the grounds  that doing otherwise-given  foreign resistance to realign- 
ment-might threaten  price stability.85 
This conjecture is supported by the fact that, over the following 
weekend, Bundesbank  President  Helmut  Schlesinger  sought  to arrange 
a general  realignment  of EMS  currencies  in return  for a reduction  in Ger- 
man interest rates.86  The Italians  are known to have been reluctant  to 
devalue, as were the British  and  the Spaniards  when sounded  out a cou- 
ple of days later. Notwithstanding  their recalcitrance,  unlimited  non- 
sterilized  interventions  and  loans through  the VSTF could  have, in prin- 
ciple, succeeded in supporting  the existing parities. But by denying  its 
request for a DM revaluation,  the other ERM member  countries sub- 
jected the Bundesbank  to demands  for intervention  incompatible  with 
its commitment  to monetary  stability. 
With  hindsight,  common  sense suggests  that  a commitment  to unlim- 
ited intervention  is not time-consistent.87  The September  crisis simply 
brought  to the surface  an  obvious  fact:  with no realignments  and  no capi- 
tal controls, the new EMS was insupportable. 
Why, of all the currencies  attacked,  did only two-the  Danish  krone 
and the French franc-escaped  unscathed?  One interpretation  is that 
the Bundesbank  provided more extensive support  for these than for 
other EMS currencies. The Bundesbank  has long been a strong sup- 
porter  of the coronation  theory, according  to which monetary  union is 
the last step in a long process of convergence  of national  monetary  poli- 
cies. A possible implication  of the coronation  theory  is that France  and 
Denmark  had  already  established  their  commitment  to convergence  and 
hence were worthy  of support.  As members  of the "convergence  club," 
France and Denmark  had inflation  rates even lower than Germany's. 
Other  countries  that had made less progress  toward  convergence may 
have been deemed  less worthy  of support. 
85. It might  be the second time  that  this clause has been used. Neumann  and  von Ha- 
gen (1992)  report  that the Bundesbank  already  invoked  it in 1983  when the French  franc 
was under  attack. 
86. For  a detailed  account  of these  negotiations  see Peter  Norman,  "The  Day  Germany 
Planted  a Currency  Time  Bomb,"  Financial  Times,  December  12-13, 1992,  p. 2. 
87. While  a central  bank  might  commit  to this before the fact, it would have strong 
incentives  to renege afterwards.  A few early commentators  on the EMS Act, such as 
Vaubel (1980) emphasized  this point. For further  discussion, see Begg and Wyplosz 
(1993). 112  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
In  light  of its commitment  to domestic  price  stability,  the Bundesbank 
simply  did not have the latitude  to provide  unlimited  support  to all EMS 
currencies.  It logically  attached  priority  to the defense of certain  curren- 
cies such as the franc  and the krone. In addition  to their  membership  in 
the convergence  club, France  and Denmark  were pivotal countries  po- 
litically. France's participation  in the monetary  union was essential to 
prevent the latter  from degenerating  into a DM area and denying Ger- 
many the political and diplomatic  concessions (such as a Community 
foreign policy) it desired as its quid  -pro quo for European  monetary 
union.88  Denmark  remained  (along with the United Kingdom)  one of 
only two EC countries  that  had  not yet ratified  the Maastricht  treaty. To 
withdraw  support  for the krone at a time when the Danish  government 
had  initiated  a second campaign  to secure ratification  might  have torpe- 
doed the entire  EMU process. 
In contrast, Italy, Spain, and Portugal  neither  played such a critical 
role politically nor clearly belonged to the EMS's hard  core. The first 
statement  also applies  to Ireland;  the second applies  to the United  King- 
dom. Thus it is logical that the Bundesbank  would have devoted its 
scarce resources  to other  currencies  first. 
There is a further  hypothesis:  that the Bundesbank  saw in the crisis 
the opportunity  to shape a monetary  union more to its liking-specifi- 
cally, one purged  of its weaker  members.  Supporting  this view is a dis- 
quieting  pattern  of public  statements  by Bundesbank  officials.89 
On August 25, Reimut Jochimsen, a member  of the Bundesbank's 
policymaking  council, suggested that a realignment  could be in the 
offing.  On  August  28, Johann  Wilheim  Gaddum,  a member  of the seven- 
man  permanent  directorate,  expressed  the view that  there  was no reason 
to cut German  interest rates. On September 10, anonymous sources 
within  the Bundesbank  suggested that the pound should be devalued. 
On September  15, newspapers  reported  sources in the Bundesbank  as 
suggesting  that a sterling  devaluation  could not be ruled out. And on 
September  16,  Helmut  Schlesinger  was widely quoted  as saying  that  Eu- 
rope's financial  difficulties  remained  unresolved. Each of these state- 
ments  worked  to destabilize  weak EMS currencies. 
88. For  further  analysis  of this issue-linkage  interpretation  of the political  economy  of 
European  monetary  union,  see Garrett  (1993)  and  Eichengreen  and  Frieden  (1993). 
89. Ivo Dawnay  and Andrew  Fisher, "Britain  Points Finger  at Germany,"  Financial 
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Until  the relevant  memoirs  and  records  are  published,  this hypothesis 
cannot  be tested. The comments  above could be dismissed  simply  as ill- 
advised statements  in the heat of battle. What is clear, in any case, is 
that  it was not realistic  to expect adequate  support,  given the size of the 
attacks  made  possible by fully liberalized  markets.  Equally  clear is that 
governments  should not expect to receive unlimited  and unconditional 
support  in future  EMS crises. 
The Way Forward 
The September  1992  crisis confirmed  an elementary  but strangely  ne- 
glected principle of international  economics: the incompatibility  of 
pegged exchange  rates, monetary  policy independence,  and full capital 
mobility.  In drawing  implications  for the transition  to EMU, it is essen- 
tial  to bear  in mind  that  the ideal solution  of simultaneously  achieving  all 
three of these desiderata  is ruled  out. Any workable  solution  will have 
to sacrifice  at least one of them, and  thus  will inevitably  meet with objec- 
tions. In this last section, we present  six options  for the future,  proceed- 
ing from  the least to the most likely. 
Attempting  to Proceed  as Before 
The first alternative  is to attempt  to proceed as before, in the belief 
that future disturbances  as severe as German  economic and monetary 
unification  are unlikely.  In this view, EMS countries  can simply  rededi- 
cate themselves to harmonizing  their macroeconomic  policies, and ex- 
change rate stability will follow. Our analysis makes clear that the 
events of September  were more than a delayed reaction to a onetime 
shock. In addition,  they reflect intrinsic  sources of instability  that are 
still very much  present. Ample scope remains  for self-fulfilling  specula- 
tive attacks to repeatedly  destabilize  the EMS. Neither the absence of 
extraneous  shocks nor  policy convergence  can rule  out self-fulfilling  at- 
tacks. If this is the correct  way of viewing  the events of September,  then 
proceeding  as before  is not feasible. 
Proceeding  as Before But with More Realignments 
The Bundesbank's  own preference  would  be to proceed  as before  but 
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we explained  in our discussion of escape clauses and robust  monetary 
rules, periodic realignments  are problematic  when capital markets  are 
free  of controls.  If there  is one clear  lesson to be drawn  from  the Septem- 
ber  crisis, it is that  markets  anticipate  events. Central  banks  that  believe 
they can peg the exchange  rate  for significant  periods  and  then change  it 
discretely  overlook  this elementary  fact. 
A variant  of this approach  is more  continuous  realignments-that is, 
shifting the band without discretely changing  the exchange rate and 
thereby  allowing  the rate  to fluctuate  over wider  range.  As we explained 
in the third  section, this is likely to aggravate  credibility  problems  be- 
cause the markets  will have reason  to doubt  that  the authorities  are com- 
mitted  to supporting  the exchange rate when it approaches  the edge of 
the existing band. Insofar  as more  frequent  shifts of the band  allow the 
exchange rate to fluctuate  over a wider range, this option creates the 
same objections  as generalized  floating,  which we consider  below. 
A Shotgun  Wedding between  Germany and France 
Marginally  more  likely is a shotgun  wedding  (perhaps  the better  anal- 
ogy would be an elopement)  between Germany  and France. If the two 
countries  credibly  commit  to close harmonization  of monetary  policies 
and  to unlimited  intervention  of whichever  currency  weakens, the DM- 
franc  rate  could  provide  a stable  core to which  other  northern  European 
currencies  could attach  themselves. 
The idea of a de facto monetary  union centered on Germany  is not 
unprecedented.  For ten years, the Netherlands  has forsaken  monetary 
sovereignty  in order  to peg the guilder  to the franc. More  recently, Bel- 
gium, Denmark, and Austria (not yet an EC member) have adopted 
Dutch-style  policies. Once France and Germany  establish a pact, Bel- 
gium, Denmark  and the Netherlands  could quickly  join. In much the 
same  way that  the EC grew  from  a core group  of six countries  to its cur- 
rent  membership  of twelve, what started  as an alliance  between two of 
the leading monetary  powers of Europe could eventually encompass 
most of the continent. 
The  problem  with  this scenario  is that,  in contrast  to the de facto mon- 
etary union between Germany  and the Netherlands  (and the more for- 
mal union between Belgium  and Luxembourg),  a Franco-German  mar- 
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latter  delegated  all  control  of household  finances  to the dominant  marital 
partner.90  Germany  is unlikely (to put it mildly) to grant seats on the 
Bundesbank's  board to officials from the Bank of France. France will 
not soon give Germany  control  of its macroeconomic  policies, in the ab- 
sence of which unlimited  intervention  is unacceptable  to the Bundes- 
bank. The Maastricht  treaty creates a broader  institutional  framework 
and safeguards  within which some such compromises and trade-offs 
should  be palatable.  Outside  of it they remain  unacceptable,  as Helmut 
Schlesinger  made  clear in a speech on March  30, 1993.9'  Absent institu- 
tional  innovations  of this sort, a commitment  to stabilize  the DM-franc 
rate  can always be abandoned  or reversed. Under  these circumstances, 
statements  that the two governments  "desire"  or "intend"  to stabilize 
the rate, however earnest,  will not be regarded  as credible. 
An Early Two-Speed EMU 
Credibility  requires  an institutional  framework  like that  attempted  by 
the Maastricht  treaty. But revising that treaty would require several 
years of intergovernmental  conferences  and yet more years  for ratifica- 
tion. If the timetable  is to be accelerated, therefore,  this must be done 
within  the confines of the existing treaty. The treaty is commonly  read 
as preventing  the initiation  of Stage  III (full  monetary  union)  before  Jan- 
uary 1, 1997.  But as we explained  above, nothing  in principle  prevents 
the EMI  and  the Commission,  which  must  report  before  the end of 1996, 
from reporting  as early as the beginning  of 1994.  The treaty  only states 
that  Stage  III must  begin  after  Stage II, and  that  Stage II begins  on Janu- 
ary 1, 1994. 
That a majority  of EC countries  must satisfy the convergence crite- 
rion  requiring  two years of exchange rate stability  might  seem to be the 
binding  constraint  on an early start. Of the twelve, only six-France, 
Germany,  Belgium,  the Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  and  Denmark-will 
90. Luxembourg  openly  delegates  control  of its monetary  policy  to Belgium,  while  the 
Netherlands  does so de facto with Germany.  This asymmetry  in the size of cooperating 
countries  may imply that exchange rate stabilization  can be effected in North America 
without  resorting  to monetary  union,  assuming  such  stabilization  eventually  becomes  nec- 
essary in conjunction  with the North American  Free Trade  Agreement,  as we suggest 
below. 
91. Christopher  Parks, "Schlesinger  Warns  on EMU Shortcuts,"  Financial Times, 
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have displayed  two years of exchange rate stability  at the beginning  of 
1994  (assuming  no additional  unforeseen  events). Greece, a non-EMS 
country,  is not a candidate,  while Italy and the United Kingdom  would 
first  have to reenter  the ERM  and  then  wait two years. Whether  a major- 
ity of EC countries  can be said to satisfy this criterion  therefore  hinges 
on the evaluation  of Ireland,  Portugal,  and Spain.  The relevant  protocol 
to the treaty states that "the Member  State [must have] respected the 
normal [2.25 percent] fluctuation margins .  .  . without severe  tensions 
for at least the last two years before the examination."92  This would ap- 
pear to rule out Ireland's  participation  before early 1995  and Spain  and 
Portugal's  for at least two years (because they have both retained  the 
wider  margins  of fluctuation).  However, the protocol  continues,  "In  par- 
ticular,  the Member  State shall not have devalued its currency's  bilat- 
eral central  rate against  any other member  State's currency  on its own 
initiative  for the same  period."  93  The on-its-own-initiative  proviso  might 
provide  a loophole through  which Ireland  could slip and deliver the re- 
quired  majority.94 
But strong-currency  countries like Germany  would allow this loop- 
hole to determine  the starting  date of EMU only if it were crystal clear 
that  the member-state(s)  in question  satisfied  the other  convergence  cri- 
teria. Projections  for 1993,  assuming  no GDP growth in EC countries, 
show no country  satisfying  both the debt and deficit  requirements.  Un- 
less these positions change dramatically,  it seems unlikely  that the on- 
its-own-initiative  loophole  would  be allowed  to determine  the outcome. 
More Exchange  Rate Flexibility 
Monetary  policy independence,  widely regarded  as useful  for policy 
purposes,  and  full capital  mobility,  as mandated  by the Single  European 
Act, can be reconciled  with  one another  by flexible  exchange  rates. This 
is why generalized  floating  is sometimes  advanced  as a natural  response 
92. Treaty  on European  Union  (the Maastricht  treaty).  See Commission  of the Euro- 
pean  Communities  (1992,  Article 109;  p. 41, and  Protocol,  Article  3, p. 185). 
93. Treaty  on European  Union  (the  Maastricht  treaty).  Emphasis  added.  See Commis- 
sion of the European  Communities,  1992,  Protocol,  Article  3, pp. 185-86). 
94. The  prospective  expansion  of the Community  cannot  relax  this  constraint.  Austria 
comes  close to satisfying  the convergence  criteria,  but  its application  is being  processed  in 
parallel  with  those of Finland  and  Sweden,  which  do not. EC procedures  make  it virtually 
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to the EC's monetary dilemma. Italy and the United Kingdom have 
shown  the way and  evince little regret. 
This proposal,  most popular  in U.S. academic  circles, is heretical  in 
the European  context. For historical  reasons-competitive devaluation 
and  related  monetary  conflicts  in the 1930s  are believed to have soured 
the European political climate-aversion  to floating in Europe is in- 
tense.95  European countries are more open to trade than the United 
States, which  means  that  exchange  rate  fluctuations  are  more  disruptive 
and  give rise to stronger  political  objections.  The Common  Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), designed  to stabilize  domestic currency  prices of certain 
agricultural  products,  is disrupted  by floating  rates. 
These problems  become more acute with the progress  of the Single 
European  Act. As intra-European  trade  expands  and  substitutability  be- 
tween the products  of competing  suppliers  grows, exchange  rate  fluctu- 
ations will give rise to even more import  penetration,  intensifying  the 
pain experienced  by import-competing  producers.  The Common  Agri- 
cultural  Policy will become more difficult  to operate in the face of ex- 
change rate changes. Exchange rate fluctuations  have always created 
strong  incentives  for illicit  cross-border  shipments  of agricultural  goods 
whose domestic currency  prices are supported.  But while this has long 
been a problem,  it becomes intractable  with the removal  of border  con- 
trols and inspections  as a consequence  of the Single European  Act.96 
Finally, there is the objection  that floating  will prevent  Europe  from 
reaping  the benefits  of the single market.  How, it is asked, could mean- 
ingful  commodity  and  factor  market  linkages  be created  in the presence 
of a dozen (or, following  enlargement,  fifteen)  national  currencies  fluc- 
tuating  against one another?  One answer is that firms  and traders  can 
95. The importance  of this historical  legacy in conditioning  European  attitudes  is em- 
phasized by Giavazzi and Giovannini  (1989). Recall that initiatives  to stabilize intra- 
European  exchange  rates  after  the breakdown  of the Bretton  Woods  System  started  imme- 
diately  with  the establishment  of the snake. 
96. For details, see Eichengreen  (1993). Many economists-ourselves  included- 
would  argue  that  economic  efficiency  would  be enhanced  by eliminating  the CAP,  and  that 
if the trade-off  is between  flexible  rates and the CAP, Europe  is better  off sacrificing  the 
latter  to secure  the former.  But there  is good reason  to conclude  that  this trade-off  is not 
politically  feasible  in the short  run, as recent  demonstrations  against  agricultural  liberal- 
ization  in France  underscore.  Over  a longer  horizon,  one can imagine  that  the CAP  could 
be transformed  into a system  of lump-sum  income supports  for European  farmers,  which 
would  reduce  its distortionary  effects and remove  one obstacle to greater  exchange  rate 
flexibility  in Europe  without  creating  political  resistance. 118  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
hedge exchange rate risk. Unfortunately,  protection is expensive. In 
particular,  investors  in plant  and  equipment  with  a long service-life  have 
little protection  available  at an affordable  price.97  R.L.A. Morsink  and 
Willem  Molle report some evidence that exchange rate variability  de- 
presses direct  foreign  investment  among  EC countries.98 
The single most damning  objection  is political. Once European  mar- 
kets become more  integrated  because of the Single  European  Act, wide 
exchange  rate swings  may become unbearable  for firms  confronted  by a 
surge  of competing  imports  suddenly  sold at bargain  prices because of 
the exchange  rate  change. That  they would seek political  redress  is pre- 
dictable. Fluctuations  within  a wide target  zone could be interpreted  as 
the intended result of beggar-thy-neighbor  policies. Political pressure 
would mount  in strong-currency  countries  to offer some form  of protec- 
tion from  members  engaging  in "exchange  dumping."  Countries  such as 
the United Kingdom,  if thought  to be manipulating  their  exchange  rates 
in order  to steal a competitive  advantage,  would be given a choice be- 
tween participating  in the monetary  union  project  or being  expelled  from 
the single market. What is ultimately  at stake, therefore is the single 
market  project  itself.99 
The United States and Canada  offer a puzzling  contrast. They have 
pursued economic integration  over the years without yet prompting 
calls for exchange rate stabilization,  much less currency  unification.'00 
This remains  true  despite very pronounced  fluctuations  in Canada's  ef- 
fective real exchange  rate (which  mainly  reflects  movements  relative  to 
97. Even three-month  contracts  in excess of $1 million  can cost 2 percent  or more. 
Options  running  more  than  five years to maturity  are virtually  unknown;  80 percent  run 
less than  one year. 
98. Morsink  and  Molle  (1991). 
99. "L'affaire  Hoover"  illustrates  the point.  The Hoover  Company  stopped  producing 
vacuum  cleaners  in France  in early 1993  in favor  of expanding  its operations  in Scotland, 
partly  in response  to sterling's  depreciation  against  the franc.  The  decision  elicited  heated 
French  and  EC-level  complaints. 
100. Schott  and  Smith  (1988)  note that  the AFL-CIO  argued  at an early  stage  in Cana- 
dian-U.S.  free trade  negotiations  that an undervalued  Canadian  dollar  conferred  on pro- 
ducers  north  of the border  an unfair  competitive  advantage;  the union  pressed  for  eventual 
one-to-one  parity.  But Schott  and Smith  conclude  that this argument  was an isolated  ex- 
ception  to general  neglect of the exchange  rate issue. Similarly,  Harris  (1991)  argues  for 
the desirability  of exchange  rate management  to prevent  persistent  misalignments,  but 
does not link  the need  for stabilization  to integration.  For  further  discussion,  see Bayoumi 
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the United States). These fluctuations,  on the order of 25 percent, as 
shown in figure 19, would be regarded  as unbearable  in Europe. Why 
this has not been true of Canada  remains  an open question. A plausible 
conjecture  is that as North American  economic integration  proceeds, 
political pressures for exchange rate stabilization  will intensify. They 
may spread  to the United States as integration  with Mexico goes for- 
ward  and  certain  U.S. industries  find  themselves at a competitive  disad- 
vantage  because of a depreciation  of the peso. 
A compromise  between pegged and freely floating  rates for Europe 
might  be wider fluctuation  bands. If bands are sufficiently  wide to re- 
move the need for realignments,  there will be no incentive for specula- 
tive attacks.  If parity  adjustments  are sufficiently  frequent,  the band  can 
be adjusted  around  the exchange  rate  without  requiring  the rate itself to 
move discretely. 
Unfortunately,  such arrangements  tend to pose credibility  problems. 
If the exchange  rate  is allowed  to fluctuate  widely and  the band  is shifted 
frequently,  it will be difficult  for observers  to determine  whether  the au- 
thorities  are adjusting  the parity  only in response to exceptional  distur- 
bances  or in  fact reverting  to preexisting  inflationary  tendencies. Capital 
might  not flow in stabilizing  directions  when the rate moved to the edge 
of the band,  and  the target  zone honeymoon  would  be lost. A high  proba- 
bility  of realignment  when the exchange  rate drifted  toward  the edge of 
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zone honeymoon with a target zone divorce.'0'  For all these reasons, 
however appealing  they are in theory, floating  exchange rates are not 
feasible in Europe  in practice. 
Throwing Sand in the Wheels of Speculation 
This  leaves only one alternative,  which  itself  has significant  disadvan- 
tages. This is an explicit or implicit  tax on foreign exchange transac- 
tions. One option is a Tobin tax of, say, 1 percent on each purchase  or 
sale of foreign exchange (a 2 percent tax on a roundtrip  transaction). 
Such a tax would discourage  speculators  from taking  one-way bets. It 
could not support  weak currencies  permanently,  but it would provide 
time to organize  orderly  realignments.  Because it is not an administra- 
tive (that  is, a quantitative)  restriction,  it would  be permissible  under  the 
provisions  of the Maastricht  treaty  and  the Single  European  Act. 
Our  preferred  option is an implicit  tax. This would require  financial 
institutions purchasing  foreign exchange with domestic currency for 
their own account or on behalf of customers to make non-interesting- 
bearing  deposits with the central bank. The Banca d'Italia pioneered 
such policies in the 1970s. Countries  could emulate the specific mea- 
sures adopted  by the Spanish  government  during  the September  crisis, 
when it required  institutions  purchasing  foreign  currency  against  the pe- 
seta to deposit a sum equivalent  to the transaction,  interest-free,  with 
the Bank  of Spain  for one year. Again,  because  deposit  requirements  are 
not an administrative  prohibition,  they do not violate either  the letter  or 
the spirit  of the Maastricht  treaty  or the Single  European  Act. 
Both measures  work  by raising  the cost of cross-border  capital  flows. 
An appealing  feature  is that  they penalize  short-term  capital  movements 
more  heavily  than  long-term  investments.  A 1  percent  tax on each trans- 
action (2 percent on a roundtrip  transaction)  represents  an annualized 
cost of nearly  8,000  percent  on a one-day  shift, 180  percent  over a week, 
27 percent over a month, but only 0.2 percent over 10 years. Because 
speculative  attacks  are based on short-term  positions, such a tax would 
limit the amount of intervention  required  to support currencies and, 
where  necessary, provide  time to arrange  orderly  realignments. 
The strength  of the Tobin tax is its transparency.  Deposit require- 
ments, while more opaque, have the advantage  that the implicit  tax in- 
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creases with the interest  rate. In normal  times, when interest rates are 
low, so is the opportunity  cost of the funds deposited in non-interest- 
bearing  accounts. Under the Bank of Spain's measure, the implicit  tax 
is an annualized  5 percent  if the interest  rate is 5 percent. The violation 
of interest  parity  is modest. But if it becomes necessary to raise interest 
rates  in response  to speculative  pressure,  the opportunity  cost increases 
accordingly.  If interest  rates are raised to triple-digit  levels, as in Swe- 
den and Ireland  during  their crises, the implicit  tax rises to triple-digit 
levels. The wedge between domestic and foreign interest  rates widens 
accordingly,  reducing  the dislocations  to the domestic  economy caused 
by policies of exchange  rate support. 
If the point of the policy is merely  to provide  enough  time to arrange 
an orderly  realignment,  then a modest Tobin tax would do. But in the 
presence of multiple  equilibria,  the authorities  may wish to resist the 
pressure  to realign.  Then it may be necessary to raise interest  rates for 
an extended  period,  in which case deposit  requirements  have a compar- 
ative advantage. 
These measures  have disadvantages,  as we explain  momentarily.  But 
it is not enough  for critics to point to their  disadvantages.  They must  of- 
fer an alternative.  And they must show that their  alternative  is feasible, 
unlike  those we have listed above. 
It might  be thought  that deposit requirements  would thwart  the cre- 
ation of an integrated  financial  market.  Recall, however, that a deposit 
requirement  is not an administrative  control. No one would be pre- 
vented from undertaking  any financial transaction. Such a measure 
would  no more  prevent  the development  of a single  financial  market  than 
modest national  taxes on carrots  prevent the development  of a single 
carrot  market. 
A second invalid objection is that, to work, such measures would 
have  to be coordinated  internationally.  Those who invoke  this view note 
that  foreign  exchange  is traded  all over the world. But this fact is irrele- 
vant:  deposit  requirements  work  by reducing  the cost to the government 
in question of supporting  its exchange rate. By creating a wedge be- 
tween domestic and foreign  interest  rates analogous  to the capital-con- 
trol  wedges documented  in the eighth section, they would limit the do- 
mestic  dislocations  caused by policies of defense. 
Other  objections  carry  more  weight. Deposit requirements  could dis- 
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duced  them  in September  1992,  for example, the blow to its burgeoning 
financial  market was severe. To minimize these costs,  the measure 
should  be applied  only for a transitional  limited  period  and  ideally  by all 
ERM  countries  simultaneously. 
A related  danger  is that,  by reducing  the liquidity  of financial  markets, 
such a measure  discourages  long-term  as well as short-term  inward  in- 
vestment. Foreign  investment  might  be depressed, not by the fact that 
investors would have to pay 1 percent to repatriate  their funds, but 
by the tendency to discourage  the development  of local financial  cen- 
ters, which would increase bid-ask spreads and related thin-market 
problems. 
A further  danger  is that  the imposition  of deposit  requirements  would 
weaken monetary  discipline and  jeopardize the convergence process. 
Aware  that  they provide  additional  room  for maneuver  for national  poli- 
cymakers, these officials might utilize their newfound freedom reck- 
lessly. While  this danger  is real, the same objection  applies  to widening 
or eliminating  fluctuation  margins.  For all these reasons, a deposit re- 
quirement  is not the best of all worlds. Our  point is that it is the best of 
all possible  worlds. 
Conclusion 
A basic axiom of international  economics is the incompatibility  of 
fixed exchange rates, full international  capital mobility, and national 
policy  autonomy.  From  this perspective,  the instability  of the EMS is no 
surprise.  Between 1987  and 1990,  realignments  were spurned  and  capital 
mobility  was perfected  by the removal  of capital  controls,  but  the option 
of independent  policies was not abandoned.  Given this incompatibility 
and some time, an EMS crisis was all but inevitable.  The only mystery 
is how its outbreak  was deferred  for so long. 
We have distinguished  four explanations  for what triggered  the 1992 
crisis: overt competitiveness problems in certain high-inflation  coun- 
tries; hidden competitiveness problems associated with German  eco- 
nomic and monetary  union; anticipated  future competitiveness prob- 
lems caused by a predictable backlash against policies pursued to 
maintain  competitiveness;  and speculative  crises of a purely  self-fulfill- 
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clear, we believe that all four explanations  apply to the 1992  crisis, al- 
though  to extents that vary across countries. But for those concerned 
with  future  options, the final  explanation  is key. 
Those who remain  optimistic  about  the prospects  for the EMS'02  and 
about the viability of the existing blueprint  for European monetary 
union  fail to appreciate  how the very structure  of the Maastricht  treaty 
is conducive  to multiple  equilibria  and self-fulfilling  speculative  attacks. 
To salvage  the Maastricht  blueprint,  it is not sufficient  for governments 
to rededicate  themselves  to policies of austerity  or to raise interest  rates 
to high levels for limited  periods. Neither step will necessarily succeed 
in fending  off speculative  attacks.  In addition,  the structure  of the Euro- 
pean monetary  system and the blueprint  for European  monetary  union 
must  be changed. 
The options for resolving this dilemma  are a forced march  to Euro- 
pean monetary  union or taxing  foreign  exchange transactions.  In prac- 
tice the first option-a  Franco-German  alliance or an early two-speed 
EMU-is  not feasible for political  reasons. This makes  us reluctant  ad- 
vocates of the last alternative:  throwing  sand in the wheels of interna- 
tional  finance. 
APPENDIX 
A Brief Overview  of Monetary  Aspects 
of the Maastricht  Treaty 
THE  MAASTRICHT TREATY laid down four convergence  criteria  that had 
to be met  by countries  that  qualified  to participate  in European  monetary 
union.  103 Countries  would have to have achieved a high  degree of price 
stability;  their average rate of CPI inflation  during  the twelve months 
preceding  the initiation  of monetary  union could be no more than 1.5 
percentage  points higher  than the inflation  rates of the three EC mem- 
ber-states  with the lowest inflation.  Countries  would  have to have main- 
tained stable exchange rates (within their normal EMS fluctuation 
102. See, for example,  the Commission  of the European  Communities  (1993). 
103. The treaty  followed  the recommendations  of the Delors  Committee  (Committee 
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bands)  for the two years  preceding  entry  without  devaluing  their  curren- 
cies. Their  long-term  interest  rates  during  the year  preceding  entry  could 
be no more  than  2 percentage  points higher  than  those of the three  mem- 
ber-states  that best controlled  inflation.  Countries  would have to have 
achieved  a "sustainable  fiscal  position";  their  budget  deficit  could be no 
more than 3 percent of GDP, and their gross public debt could not ex- 
ceed 60 percent  of GDP.  104 
The  treaty  specified  a transition  to take  place in stages. Stage  I, begin- 
ning with the removal  of capital  controls in 1990,  was to be marked  by 
the reduction  of inflation  and  interest  rate  differentials  and  by a stabiliz- 
ing of exchange  rates. Stage II, to begin on January  1, 1994,  would pre- 
pare actively for monetary union. Domestic laws would have to be 
changed  to conform  to all aspects of the Maastricht  treaty.  In particular, 
national central banks would have to be made fully independent, as 
specified  in the treaty. A transitional  entity, the European  Monetary  In- 
stitute (EMI), would be created at the beginning  of Stage II. It would 
coordinate  member-countries'  monetary  policies in the final  phases of 
the transition  and  plan  the move to monetary  union. 
Stage III would inaugurate  monetary  union and establish the Euro- 
pean Central  Bank  (ECB). National  central  banks  would  continue  to ex- 
ist as subsidiaries  of the ECB, mostly  to take  charge  of bank  supervision 
and  provide  hospitality  for academic  conferences. 
104. Unlike  the first  three  conditions,  the fourth  is subject  to significant  qualifications. 
For analysis  and discussion  see Kenen (1992),  Buiter,  Corsetti,  and Roubini  (1993),  and 
Eichengreen  (1992). Comments 
and Discussion 
William H. Branson: This paper by Barry Eichengreen  and Charles 
Wyplosz clearly lays out the facts and data and chronicles the events 
leading to the collapse of the European  monetary system (EMS), or, 
more  precisely, its exchange  rate  mechanism  (ERM),  in the fall of 1992. 
The paper  presents  one model  of multiple  equilibria  rational  speculative 
attacks and two models of shocks to the fundamentals,  current  or ex- 
pected, and  argues  that  the model  of speculative  attacks  is more  relevant 
to explain  the collapse. I question  the utility  of the particular  models  pre- 
sented in the paper  to analyze the problems  to which they are applied, 
and I disagree  with the emphasis  on the speculative  attack  explanation 
of the collapse, so most of my comments  will discuss these points. The 
paper  continues with a clear discussion of the political  economy of the 
collapse, with which I agree. It ends with a recommendation  of a Tobin 
tax on foreign  exchange  transactions;  this follows from  the emphasis  on 
the speculative  attack  explanation,  so I also dissent on this point. 
After a brief introduction,  the second section of the paper  describes 
the three stages of the new EMS since 1987  as no realignments,  no con- 
trols, and no stability.  The discussion is accurate, but its structure  im- 
plies that  the combination  of no realignments  and  no controls  leads to no 
stability,  anticipating  the preference  for the speculative  attack  explana- 
tion of the collapse. The third  section begins the analysis  with a discus- 
sion of three necessary conditions for a system of pegged, but adjust- 
able, exchange rates, the old pre-1987  EMS. The three conditions are 
scope for relative  price adjustments  in the event of relative  real distur- 
bances, robust monetary  rules to prevent rational  speculative  attacks, 
and  capacity  to contain  market  forces, just in case. I agree  with the first 
point, but have difficulty  with the argument  supporting  the second, and 
therefore  with the third,  as well. 
The discussion of robust monetary  rules in the third  section alludes 
to, and  is based on, the Obstfeld  speculative  attack  model  with multiple 
equilibria,  which is discussed in the seventh section. That discussion 
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uses the structure  of the model of expected shocks to the fundamentals 
presented  in the sixth section, so I will combine  my comments  on these 
two sections here, focusing on the speculative  attack argument  for ro- 
bust monetary  rules. 
In the speculative  attack  model, speculators  correctly  anticipate  that 
a "wet"  government  will ease monetary  policy after  an attack;  thus the 
government  is forced to do so by the attack. Accordingly,  an attack  not 
based on fundamentals  succeeds. This descriptive  story uses the model 
of the sixth section  to illustrate  its points. I have problems  at several  lev- 
els with both the speculative  attack  story and  the supporting  model. 
The attack is said to occur because the speculators  know that they 
will make capital  gains on foreign  assets when they repurchase  the de- 
preciated home currency. But the purchasing  power of these capital 
gains  is eliminated  by the rise in the home country's  price  level, propor- 
tionate  to the depreciation.  Between equilibria  in equations  17  and 18, e, 
p, and m all change  by the same amount,  moving  from point  A to point 
B in figure 15. The only asset in the model is the home country's real 
money held by the private  sector, and it is unchanged  between equilib- 
ria. At a deeper  level, it is unclear  why the attack  equilibrium  exists. If 
the government  knows that  it is wet and  will succumb  to the attack,  then 
as soon as it sees the horde  of rational  representative-agent  speculators 
crowding  at the foreign  exchange  window, it will give way, increase  the 
money supply, and devalue, rather  than  lose reserves. The speculators 
will then secure no capital  gains, and  they know this. Thus they will not 
bother  to mount  the attack  in the first  place. 
The technical  properties  of the model  are  also somewhat  unclear.  Fig- 
ure 15  has saddle  paths  SS, derived  from  figure  13,  and  the exchange  rate 
jumps from  point  A to point C. However, the dynamic  properties  of the 
coefficient matrix  of e and p in equations 17 and 18 are unclear. If we 
assume  that  e is the  jump  variable  for the SS paths  in figures  13  and 15  to 
exist as shown, the constant-p  locus (not shown) should be positively 
sloped, and the constant-e  locus negatively sloped. But from equation 
17, the slope of the constant-e  locus is {1  - [(1  - kc)Iah]},  which has an 
indeterminate  sign that could easily be positive. Sufficient  assumptions 
could  rule  this out, but  that  would  further  weaken  the utility  of the model 
in illustrating  the story. 
To sum up, the story of multiple  equilibria  with speculative attacks 
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fundamentals  equilibrium,  but the model employed here does not sup- 
port the story very well. However, it may well be that the model that 
would support  the story is sufficiently  technical  to be included  in an ap- 
pendix or reference  list. If the multiple  equilibria  problem  turns  out to 
be theoretically  implausible  or empirically  unsupported,  then the need 
to contain  the market,  and this paper's  argument  for the Tobin tax, are 
correspondingly  weakened. 
The fourth section of the paper  reviews data on competitiveness  as 
evidence that  the collapse was not caused by a change  in the fundamen- 
tals. The relevance  of this material  is undermined  a bit in the fifth  section 
by the clear discussion of German  reunification  as the disturbance  to 
fundamentals.  The basic  problem  was not a deterioration  in the competi- 
tiveness of the non-German  EMS members  and  other  countries  pegging 
to the EMS; it was essentially a fiscal shock coming  from Germany,  as 
is described  in the fifth  section. The data  in the fourth  section are useful 
in indicating  where the pressure  would  appear  first,  however. The dete- 
rioration  of the competitive  position  in Italy is clear, and  the collapse of 
Finnish  trade  with the Soviet Union weakened Finland's  position. The 
case of Sweden is less clear, however. The competitiveness  measures 
for Sweden in figure  4 turned  around  in 1989. 
The fundamentals  shock from the German  reunification  is described 
in such a convincing  way in the fifth section that I am surprised  to see 
the speculative  attack  model survive  as the preferred  explanation  at the 
paper's end. The fiscal expansion that accompanied  the reunification 
caused  a real  appreciation  of the equilibrium  value of the deutsche mark 
(DM). This can be seen in several  ways. In the standard  Mundell-Flem- 
ing model used in the paper, the fiscal expansion  puts upward  pressure 
on German  interest rates, causing a capital inflow and appreciation  of 
the equilibrium  value of the DM.  ' This is shown in figure  10. This is the 
standard  result, although  I have a problem  with the use of the model as 
specified here. From equation 7, the slope of the constant-q locus is 
given by the term - {11[2h(a  - bc)]};  its sign is unclear.  The saddle  path 
(not shown)  may not exist. 
The Mundell-Fleming  model does not include the specification of 
portfolio  balance  with home and foreign  assets, and therefore  does not 
1. This model  is similar  to the two-country  Dornbusch  model  used in Branson  (1988) 
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include  the stock equilibrium  condition  of current  account  balance.2  In 
a model  of this sort, the fiscal shift  accompanying  the German  reunifica- 
tion  is a shift  in the German  equilibrium  international  net credit  position. 
Germany  has gone to the international  credit  markets  to finance  the re- 
unification.  If it began in a position of current  account balance-as  the 
United States did in a similar  episode beginning  in 1981-to  reduce its 
net credit  position, Germany  would  have to run  a current  account  deficit 
for a time. This would  require  a real  appreciation.  Eventually,  to restore 
current  account  balance,  the appreciation  would  have to be reversed,  as 
it was in the case of the United States. Because Germany  began out of 
equilibrium  with a current  account surplus  of about $50 billion, there 
was a possibility  that  the adjustment  could  have been achieved  by a one- 
time appreciation  that  eliminated  the surplus,  with no eventual  reversal 
of the path  of the DM. In any event, Germany  now has a current  account 
deficit, so some reversal  is to be expected. 
Both the Mundell-Fleming  model and the portfolio balance model 
provide a third  way to see the need for appreciation  of the DM in real 
terms. The fiscal expansion  increases relative  demand  for German  ver- 
sus world goods, or for nontraded  versus traded goods in Germany. 
Both effects require  a real appreciation  to restore  equilibrium. 
The equilibrium  real  appreciation  shown  in figure  10  is a deterioration 
in equilibrium  German  competitiveness.  This  is mirrored  by an improve- 
ment  in equilibrium  competitiveness  in the other  EMS countries,  to pro- 
vide the aggregate  current  account surplus  that would match the Ger- 
man deficit. This implies that in the figures of the fourth section on 
competitiveness, the equilibrium  values would have jumped down in 
1990,  when the equilibrium  real DM appreciated,  as shown in figure  10. 
Thus  the fourth  section might  be reinterpreted  to say that  because none 
of the measures did jump down, the competitiveness of all the other 
countries deteriorated  as a result of German reunification.  This re- 
interpretation,  consistent with the movement  in figure 10, would make 
the data of the fourth section argue  for the fundamentals  model-not 
against  it. 
The policy conflict  that  followed the reunification  shock is described 
well in the fifth section. The DM could appreciate  in real terms either 
2. See Branson  and  Marchese  (1988)  and  Branson  (1993)  for an application  to the cur- 
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through  a combination  of German  inflation  relative to the rest of the 
EMS, or by a nominal  appreciation.  The Bundesbank  stood against  rela- 
tive inflation  and repeatedly  requested  a realignment.  The request was 
refused by the partner  central  banks, which had tied the credibility  of 
their anti-inflationary  policies to the DM. Just when they thought  they 
had achieved credibility  by attaching  themselves to the stable center, 
the shocks started  coming from the center! They remained  tied to the 
DM, getting  the negative effects of both high interest  rates and the real 
appreciation  of the DM against  the dollar  and  the yen. 
The effects of the reunification  shock, combined with the Bundes- 
bank's determination  not to inflate, seem clear in the data. From late 
1989 to mid-1990,  long-term  interest rates in Germany increased by 
more  than  200  basis points. In early 1990,  German  long rates  rose above 
those in the United States and have stayed above since. With  their  cur- 
rencies still tied credibly  to the DM, the rest of the EMS countries  expe- 
rienced increases in their long-term  rates. During  the same period, the 
DM appreciated  in real terms  by about  8 percent, pulling  the rest of the 
EMS along with it. The German  investment  and fiscal boom continued 
through  1991,  while the rest of Europe slipped into recession. German 
monetary  policy tightened  sharply  in late 1990  and short-term  interest 
rates  continued  to climb  until  the crisis of September  1992.  This brought 
German  growth  to zero by the end of 1992.  When  the crisis came in Sep- 
tember,  each of the partners  devalued  separately,  destroying  the credi- 
bility  that  they had sought  to maintain  by refusing  to let the DM appreci- 
ate unilaterally. 
My view is that  the collapse of the ERM  came from  the reunification 
shock and the inability  of the new EMS to allow an upward  revaluation 
of the DM. The timing  of the crisis was influenced  by the Danish and 
French referendums.  The pressure was building  in the balloon, and it 
had to burst sometime and somewhere. The place was Helsinki, and 
then Rome-the  weakest points in the system. I think  this view is sup- 
ported  by the data and arguments  in the Eichengreen-Wyplosz  paper. 
The  paper  describes  the fundamentals  shock clearly  in the fifth  section, 
but  barely  mentions  this analysis  in the conclusion. I do not see why the 
authors  so strongly support  the speculative attack model, except per- 
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Rudiger  Dornbusch: The crash  of the EMS in the fall of 1992  was more 
spectacular  than anyone had imagined, even officials at the Bundes- 
bank,  who always knew it could not last and did not mind  a bit. Central 
banks were far more hard-nosed  about defending  currencies  than had 
been imagined,  and financial  markets  called their bluff with verve and 
gusto. Much public money was distributed  to strong-armed  specula- 
tors-enough  for Lawrence  Summers,  now Undersecretary  of the U.S. 
Treasury,  to comment  that  the British  surely  would have been better  off 
spending  $25 billion  on roads and bridges,  rather  than blowing  it in the 
foreign  exchange  market.  Barry  Eichengreen  and  Charles  Wyplosz  offer 
a careful, although  controversial,  account of the events and the policy 
lessons that  might  be drawn  from  the collapse. 
I differ  from  their  analysis  in four  specific  ways. First,  their  claim  that 
no pervasive competitiveness  problem  existed is not persuasive. Sec- 
ond, I question the model of self-fulfilling  expectations. Third, I have 
problems with the authors' policy recommendations  to facilitate the 
transition  from  an EMS into an EMU. Finally, I question  the usefulness 
of the Maastricht  treaty, which is taken  for granted  in their  paper. 
Competitiveness 
The paper  argues  that Italy probably  had competitiveness  problems, 
while the United Kingdom  and Spain  perhaps  had some such problems, 
and other countries  had none. To support  this contention, the authors 
present  indexes of unit  labor  costs. There  are  three  reasons  why this ap- 
proach  is not fully satisfactory;  I will comment  on each, using Spain  as 
an example. 
Discussion  figure  DI shows Spain's  real  exchange  rate  based  on (non- 
food) manufacturing  wholesale prices and using trade weights of forty 
countries. It is apparent  that from 1984  to 1992,  the real exchange rate 
appreciated  steadily. Much  of that appreciation  may have been  justified 
by the prospects  ofjoining the Common  Market.  But,  just as in the case 
of Mexico and NAFTA today, there must be a limit on the charitable 
interpretation;  perhaps  as much as 15 or 20 percent overvaluation  had 
accumulated.  Basically, the Spanish  model  amounted  to a government- 
labor  agreement  on wages, always excessive in view of a fixed  exchange 
rate, with inflationary  consequences insufficiently  contained  by high  in- 
terest rates and  the competitive  bite of a fixed exchange  rate. Barry Eichengreen  and Charles Wyplosz  131 
Figure Dl.  Spanish Real Exchange Rate,  1970-92 
Index, 1980-82 =100 
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Source:  Unpublished  data from Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. 
Another indication of competitiveness shifts away from manufac- 
tured goods to nontraded  ones. Using the Union Bank of Switzerland 
comparison  of the price  level in various  cities, with Zurich  equal  to 100, 
Madrid stood at 77.3 in 1988, just above Frankfurt  (76.6) and Paris 
(76.2).' By 1991,  Madrid  had climbed  to 93.8, while Frankfurt  and Paris 
remained  virtually  the same. 
The authors  recognize  that  real  appreciation  took place; they refer  to 
a "massive real appreciation"  since 1987. They do not consider this a 
loss in competitiveness,  but  rather  a reflection  of Spain's  high  productiv- 
ity growth  (also called the Balassa-Samuelson  effect). In fact, however, 
the data  do not bear  this  out. Spain's  economy-wide  productivity  growth 
averaged 1.3 percent from 1987  to 1990;  the measure  for industry  was 
only 0.03 percent (measured  as real GDP per person employed). Thus, 
Spain's  productivity  was faring  very poorly-the  opposite  of a situation 
in which the Balassa-Samuelson  effect might  be significant. 
By the early 1990s,  the Spanish  boom was petering  out. The budget 
deficit  was large,  the current  account  deficit  was big, unemployment  was 
rising,  and  very high  real  interest  rates  projected  further  deterioration  of 
macroeconomic  performance.  Even if the measured  real exchange rate 
shown  in discussion  figure  DI had not deteriorated,  a broad  range  of in- 
dicators  would  have to be considered  to determine  whether  the situation 
could  be sustained.  Rising  unemployment,  no prospects  for a major  re- 
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Table  Dl.  Spanish  Macroeconomic  Indicators,  1980-92 
Indicator  1980-90  1990  1991  1992 
GDP  growth  ratea  2.8  3.6  2.4  1.0 
Unemployment  rate  17.4  15.9  17.0  20.1 
Inflation  ratea  9.9  6.7  5.5  5.3 
3-month  real interest  ratea  5.1  8.5  7.7  8.0 
Current accountb  -1.0  -  3.7  - 2.9  -4.1 
Budget  deficitb  4.3  4.0  5.0  5.2 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using OECD Economic  Otilook,  December  1992, and data from Banco  Santender. 
a.  Percent per year. 
b.  Percent of GDP. 
duction in real interest rates, and an already significant  budget deficit 
suggest  that  a problem  existed. This conclusion  is clear  in discussion  ta- 
ble DI, which  presents  macroeconomic  indicators  for Spain.  Moreover, 
interest  rates can be low only if the currency  is perceived as underval- 
ued, and  hence expected to appreciate;  no such prospect  was present  in 
Spain,  and  the only possibility  for low rates would  be in the context of a 
major  realignment. 
The perception  that  by 1991-92,  Spain  had  an overvalued  currency  is 
reinforced  by the events in Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic  and 
Hungary,  for example,  had  emerged  as new potential  competitors.  They 
have substantially  the same levels of education and sophistication  as 
Spain,  they are  located much  closer to Germany,  their  wages are  a small 
fraction  of those in Spain, and their  labor  relations  are far more  favora- 
ble than  those in ossified, socialist Spain. No surprise  then that foreign 
direct  investment  in Spain  risked  drying  up and  that existing  businesses 
might  even be relocated. 
In summary,  then, a number  of arguments  suggest that Spain had a 
real  exchange  rate  that  was overvalued.  Accordingly,  it was only a ques- 
tion of time and circumstances  until an adjustment  would occur. High 
interest  rates  and  a willingness  to raise  them  further  could  postpone  such 
a day  of reckoning  for a long time but, as Herb  Stein  has said, something 
that  cannot  last  forever  will ultimately  come to an end. Some of the same 
arguments  made  for the case of Spain  apply  to other  economies. 
The central  fact of the EMS has been this: no single  currency  had an 
equal  chance  of appreciating  and  depreciating  against  the DM. Each  was 
soft relative  to the DM. That  implied  a significant  bias in the foreign  ex- 
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the bias grew over time and ultimately  was just waiting  for events to 
force a speculative  attack.  There  was no difference  between the attacks 
of the fall of 1992  and  the attacks  on the dollar/DM  rate  in the 1960s. 
Hard and Soft Strategies 
The authors  elaborate  a model in which central  banks act as though 
their  money  is hard  until  their  bluff  is called;  then, once the currency  has 
been taken out of the EMS, they display their true "soft"  nature.  The 
story is inappropriate  in two ways. First, as a rendition  of policy, it de- 
scribes  Italy  very poorly. Interest  rates  remain  extremely  high  and, once 
the lira  was toppled,  a veritable  and  amazing  range  of reforms  got under- 
way. The impossible  happened  every day and still continues. Pervasive 
privatization  has been accepted politically and is actually moving for- 
ward;  budget  balancing  is proceeding  against  all odds; the political sys- 
tem is being cleaned  out; and, most importantly,  interest  rates have not 
been cut in half. In fact, contrary  to the model, discipline  about  inflation 
is central  to the Italian  strategy.  No one would  question  that  today Italy 
looks far more serious  than  before the attack. 
The same question  must be raised  for France, although  the currency 
remains  in the EMS. Imagine  France  left and cut interest  rates by half. 
Would  that mean that France  had gone soft on inflation?  With  no infla- 
tion to speak of and with a mounting  recession, moving  to real interest 
rates  of 2 to 3 percent  would  be far  from  a soft strategy.  Germany  has an 
inflation  problem  and  France  does not;  not matching  Germany's  interest 
rates  would  not mean  that  France  is soft. Thus  the model  of self-fulfilling 
expectations may ultimately  be correct  for the United Kingdom,  but it 
is really  not a good story  for Italy, nor  would  it be for France  if the franc 
were forced  out of the EMS. 
Policy  Recommendations 
The authors  opt for a Tobin tax or reserve requirements  against  for- 
eign  exchange  transactions  as the transition  device. The Bundesbank,  in 
preparation  for the EMS, insisted that all members  demonstrate  that 
they could hold their  rate without  the protection  of controls. 
Moving away from that prescription  and allowing the transition  to 
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poor strategy.  Countries  have to work less hard  to converge-not  only 
in inflation,  but also in competitiveness.  By the time the shift  to a single 
currency would be about to happen, the issue of one last alignment 
would become an overwhelming  possibility. No amount  of talk could 
preclude  it and  therefore  crises would continue. For years, capital  mar- 
kets would  be focused on this issue, rather  than  on allocating  capital  in- 
ternationally. 
Of course, there are other possibilities. One would be to fix perma- 
nently the current  account rates but to free capital account exchange 
rates  and  allow  the free  flow  of capital.  Such  a system  of dual  rates  would 
not interfere with countries' ability to set interest rates. It would be 
messy, but far less messy than a pervasive system of controls. Of 
course, a still  better  idea  would  be to get rid  of the Maastricht  treaty  and 
move instead to a two-track  EMS strategy.2  Countries  such as Italy or 
Spain  would  do better  with  a crawling  peg exchange  rate  mechanism  that 
allows them to maintain  moderate  inflation  and competitiveness  while 
focusing on the problem  of rebuilding  their economies. Germany,  the 
Netherlands,  and France, in contrast, should  have a fixed rate without 
any margins. 
DM Fixation 
In the late 1980s,  the EMS evolved into a system in which failure  of 
progress  on convergence  led central  bankers  to increasingly  emphasize 
the value of credibility-of  staying  the course even if the rewards  were 
becoming questionable  and the price increasingly  stiff. The situation 
was reminiscent  of the 1930s,  in which  adhering  to the gold standard  was 
the conservative  thing  to do, even if it hurt  an economy. For countries 
such as Italy and Spain, and, for a while, the United Kingdom,  aligning 
with the DM was a substitute  for a domestic  policy toward  inflation  and 
growth. Obviously, central  bankers  had painted  themselves into a cor- 
ner. Having  asserted  that leaving  the EMS was inconceivable  on credi- 
bility grounds, tantamount  to losing the entire buildup of reputation 
overnight, this way of thinking  became a profound  obstacle to sound 
policymaking.  It remains  so today. 
It is difficult  to believe that Spain  would adopt  a crawling  peg; Spain 
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uses the fixed rate to contain  inflation-having failed to solve the prob- 
lem of organizing  a competitive  labor  market.  Occasional  currency  cri- 
ses and permanently  high real interest rates are part of that misguided 
strategy. 
In France, the one sound strategy  would be to let the currency  float, 
cut interest rates by half, and leave Germany  with the problem  of de- 
fending  the franc  (against  too much of a depreciation,  and hence a Ger- 
man  competitiveness  crisis). The immediate  result  would  be lower rates 
across Europe as German  suddenly had to play defensively. German 
real appreciation  would have gone too far and real interest  rates would 
have to be cut to compensate.3  But, in France, this is considered un- 
sound,  just as it was in the 1930s  to leave gold. As a result, DM fixation 
means  that France  will continue  to follow Germany's  anti-inflation  pol- 
icy, even though  it has no inflation  problem.  This is the magic spell of 
gold and the DM or France's  lack of confidence  in its own policies. 
Maastricht  Is an Anachronism 
In the postwar  period, Western  Europe integrated  for two reasons. 
One was to preserve  peace between Germany  and France, and the sec- 
ond was to build a strong  barrier  against  communism.  Along the way, 
the European Community  widened, with the inclusion of a growing 
number  of countries, including  Portugal,  Spain, and Greece. Also, the 
agenda  widened  on the economic  front  to carry  forward  a stronger  mar- 
ket integration.  Of the two basic objectives, the first-peace  between 
Germany  and France-was  accomplished  decades ago, and the second 
has become obsolete. The question is whether the objective of Maas- 
tricht  still makes sense. 
A far  better  strategy  than  trying  to create  a common  currency  for Ger- 
many  and, say, Portugal-which have no shared  history  or for that  pur- 
pose anything  in common-is  to widen the European  community  to the 
East. The right  issue for today is to bring  in Hungary,  Poland,  the Czech 
Republic,  and other Eastern European  countries,  just as in the 1980s, 
there  was good reason  to integrate  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Greece. 
These Eastern  European  economies have as much  claim  to being  part 
of Europe  as does Greece, Portugal,  or Spain,  and  their  need  for integra- 
3. See Dornbusch  and  Wolf  (1992)  on the real  exchange  rate  and  real  interest  implica- 
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tion on economic and political grounds  is far more urgent. The Maas- 
tricht  agenda  draws  an even sharper  line between Eastern  and Western 
Europe  than  exists today. The more  the West pushes its integration,  the 
more  it excludes the East. The more  the West integrates,  the more  diffi- 
cult it is to accept that the East would  join an arrangement  in which the 
poor make the laws and the rich pay the taxes. If anything,  the pursuit 
of Maastricht  must be interpreted  as a desperate  dash forward  to erect 
insurmountable  barriers  to integration  with the East. It does so in fact, 
whether  that  is the intent  or not. 
General Discussion 
Several  panel  members  took up  the theme  of whether  monetary  union 
in  Europe was  necessary or  desirable. Greg Mankiw questioned 
whether  a monetary  union was necessary for the EC common market 
project  to proceed. James  Tobin  noted that  free trade  does not require  a 
fixed exchange  rate. Stanley Fischer pointed  out that there is a floating 
exchange  rate  between the partners  of the world's  largest  bilateral  trad- 
ing relationship-the United States and  Canada. 
Others  pointed  to the relevance  of the United States as an established 
monetary  union. Robert  Gordon  recalled  the finding  of Olivier  Blanch- 
ard  and Lawrence Katz (BPEA, 1:1992) that in the United States, high 
labor  mobility  accomplished  most of the adjustment  to regional  shocks 
in demand.  Without  such mobility, Gordon  seriously  doubted  whether 
the diverse countries of Europe could form a stable monetary  union. 
Robert  Hall wondered  whether the United States is in fact an optimal 
currency  area. He pointed  to the 1861-79  period  in which California  re- 
tained  the gold definition  of the dollar, while other states shifted  to the 
greenback. Following recent shocks to the California  economy, the 
process of adjustment  might  be eased if the state had its own currency. 
Rudi  Dornbusch  suggested  that  because  the California  state  government 
had, in mid-1992,  paid  its employees in scrip,  the state was already  mov- 
ing toward  having  its own currency. 
Charles  Wyplosz labelled some of the cynicism among U.S. econo- 
mists about  European  monetary  union  as the American  view of Europe. 
Europeans  themselves recognize  the political  imperative  of uniting  Eu- Barry Eichengreen  and Charles Wyplosz  137 
rope. In particular,  historical  fears about the strength  of a united Ger- 
many  have accelerated  the recent  drive  for  deeper  integration.  The plans 
for monetary  union are one manifestation  of this. However, up to now, 
the positive role of the EMS has been to stop competitive  depreciations 
and to provide an anchor for disinflation  in the European economy. 
Wyplosz therefore  argued  in favor of amending,  rather  than scrapping, 
the Maastricht  treaty  because  he feared  that  abandoning  the treaty  could 
abort  European  economic integration  more  generally.  Dornbusch  noted 
that the Maastricht  treaty was itself an amendment  of the Treaty of 
Rome  and, as such, could be amended  without  serious  harm.  In contrast 
to Wyplosz, he reasoned that competitive  devaluations  were precisely 
what was needed  to enable  the Bundesbank  to loosen its tight  monetary 
grip  on the European  economy. 
William  Branson further  underlined  the political imperative  that is 
driving European  monetary  integration;  despite the evidence of only 
minimal  gains from  monetary  union, strong  forces in Europe  continued 
to promote  it. Stanley Fischer pointed out the divergence  between the 
views of the German  government, which favors a strong Paris-Bonn 
axis, and the Bundesbank,  which appears  to be opposed to EMU, in- 
cluding  a French-German  monetary  union. He suggested  that the Bun- 
desbank had an interest in seeing Italy and Britain  forced out of the 
EMS, and  so had  done little  to support  them  when their  currencies  came 
under pressure last year. Nevertheless, Fischer believed it was still 
likely that the Maastricht  plans would proceed, with six of the curren- 
cies aboard  for the next stage of plans  for EMU. William  Nordhaus  sug- 
gested that the difficult  and costly experience  of German  economic and 
monetary union could have blunted the appetite for monetary union 
throughout  Europe. 
Dornbusch questioned the assertion that the recent experience of 
fixed  exchange  rates  without  the support  of capital  controls  was unprec- 
edented in modern  times, pointing  to 1925-31  as another  such period. 
Eichengreen  responded  that he felt that the interwar  period  showed the 
importance  of robust  monetary  rules if fixed exchange  rate systems are 
to survive.  Robert  Solomon  noted the historical  precedent  of Britain  re- 
joining  the gold standard  in 1925  at an unrealistic  parity. He suggested 
that Britain  had repeated  the mistake  by joining the ERM at too high a 
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Nordhaus  saw the paper  as a search for the match that lit the blaze 
of realignments  in 1992.  However, he questioned  whether  the authors' 
model  was adequate  to capture  the "tipping"  phenomenon  that they en- 
visaged, which had brought on a  "feeding frenzy" of  speculators. 
Wyplosz responded  to the two discussants' comments that the paper 
had too quickly  rejected  the Krugman-type  model of speculative  attack 
based on diverging  fundamentals.  He acknowledged  that both models 
considered  in the paper, the Krugman-type  and the multiple  equilibria 
type, had some explanatory  power. However, he continued  to favor the 
latter  view, based on the self-perpetuating  expectations  of speculators, 
because of the apparently  random  timing  of the recent attacks. By Sep- 
tember  1992,  macroeconomic  adjustment  was well underway  in Europe. 
The deutsche  mark  was undergoing  real  appreciation  as a result  of rising 
German  inflation  and falling inflation  in the rest of Europe; hence the 
fundamentals  would not have suggested  an attack  at that time. In addi- 
tion, the authors'  survey of traders  indicated  that only a minority  were 
worried about devaluations before the French referendum  on Maas- 
tricht.  This suggested  that  few were concerned  about  underlying  funda- 
mental  problems  before  then. 
As a way forward  in Europe, Solomon  proposed  fixed  but adjustable 
exchange rates, rather  than irrevocable  monetary  union. Tobin coun- 
tered  that  adjustable  pegs are inherently  unstable.  Wyplosz agreed  with 
Tobin that with high capital  mobility, an adjustable  peg in itself would 
not solve European  monetary  problems. He clarified  that the paper's 
proposal of restrictions  orn  capital flow referred  to short-term  capital 
only. He acknowledged  that  this was a second-best  policy argument,  but 
noted that short-term  capital  controls  were in place in many  EC nations 
until recently. Countries, such as Spain or Portugal,  that reverted to 
controls had time to arrange  for realignment,  while those that had not 
resorted to controls, such as Britain  or Italy, were quickly forced out 
of the ERM. In response to Dornbusch's  suggestion  that Germany  and 
France move rapidly  toward  fixed exchange rates while the ERM con- 
tinues for other countries with wider bands, Eichengreen expressed 
concern that wider bands would cause credibility problems. These 
would make it difficult  to preserve the EMS without some restrictions 
on speculative  capital  flows. 
Tobin reminded  participants  that his original  proposal  for a "Tobin 
tax"  was limited  to a transactions  tax and was not tied to the use of ad- Barry Eichengreen  and Charles Wyplosz  139 
ministrative  controls on capital  flows. He noted that his original  argu- 
ment  was made  in the context of floating  rates, but  agreed  that  it applied 
also to fixed  rates. Wyplosz  highlighted  the irony  of the pendulum  swing 
in mainstream  views about exchange  rates:  from supporting  fixed rates 
in the 1960s  to favoring  floating  rates in the 1970s,  and  now leaning  back 
toward  favoring  varieties  of fixed rate  regimes. 140  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
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